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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing
on the microeconomic side of the discipline, I present an overview of current
research on four of the fundamental institutions of a political economy: voters,
politicians, parties and governments. For each of these topics, I identify and
discuss some of the salient questions that have been posed and addressed in
the literature, present some stylized models and examples, and summarize the
main theoretical ﬁndings. Furthermore, I describe the available data, review
the relevant empirical evidence, and discuss some of the challenges for empirical
research in political economy.
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As a ﬁeld, Political Economy has undergone a process of dramatic change over the years. This
process, which spans over more than two centuries, has helped to deﬁne the boundaries of
the ﬁeld’s domain, organize its subject matter, and establish an identity for modern political
economy.
At the risk of trivializing, it might be useful to summarize some of the steps along the
process that has characterized the evolution of the meaning of the term political economy.
Starting from the late 1700s, when the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo played a
fundamental role in establishing economics as an autonomous discipline, political economy
and economics were for a long time synonymous. A clear indication of the long-lasting
lack of separation between political economy and economics is the fact that when in 1892,
following the inception of the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Economic Journal,
the University of Chicago Press also started to publish a journal in economics, it titled it
the Journal of Political Economy.1
As a discipline, economics started to organize itself into ﬁelds at the beginning of the
20th century. However, while political economy clearly did not ﬁt all of the subject matter of
some of the ﬁe l d s ,i td i dn o td e ﬁne a separate ﬁeld. In fact, it was not until the 1950s that the
term political economy started to have a diﬀerent, more precise meaning, separate from the
generic notion that politics and government policy are intimately interrelated. The change
of emphasis emerges quite clearly from Anthony Downs’ 1957 book An Economic Theory of
Democracy and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s 1962 book The Calculus of Consent.2
At the same time, the publication of Kenneth Arrow’s book Social Choice and Individual
1The Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Economic Journal were established in 1886 and 1891,
respectively.
2In the beginning of the book’s preface, Buchanan and Tullock (1962; p. v) write: “This is a book
about the political organization of a society of free men. Its methodology, its conceptual apparatus, and
its analytics are derived, essentially, from the discipline that has as its subject the economic organization
of such a society. Students and scholars in politics w i l ls h a r ew i t hu sa ni n t e r e s ti nt h ec e n t r a lp r o b l e m
under consideration. Their colleagues in economics will share with us an interest in the construction of the
argument. This work lies squarely along that mythical, and mystical, borderline between these two prodigal
oﬀsprings of political economy.”
1Values in 1951, marked the birth of social choice theory, which provided vital impetus for the
development of analytical tools to study the (economic and political) outcomes of political
processes.3
During the last twentyﬁve years, the systematic study of the interactions between political
and economic factors has grown considerably within many ﬁelds in economics.4 At the same
time, the increased interest in applications has been paralleled by a surge in theoretical
research aimed at developing a common, rigorous language and a coherent class of models to
analyze political institutions and outcomes as endogenous, equilibrium phenomena. It is the
combination of the outcomes of these eﬀorts that now deﬁnes political economy as a ﬁeld.
As we progress into the 21st century, it seems legitimate at this juncture to try to assess
some of the more recent developments in political economy and place them in perspective,
with the hope of enhancing our understanding of the directions in which research in the
ﬁeld is moving. Rather than embarking in the impossible task of producing a comprehensive
(or even partial) survey of the literature, however, I focus here on a (small) number of
speciﬁc issues, and attempt to summarize the state of knowledge of these issues, both from
a theoretical and an empirical point of view, as well as present my own take on the subjects.
One of the fundamental premises of political economy is that the actions of governments
can be understood only as consequences of the political forces that enable governments to
acquire and maintain power. Hence, a large fraction of the existing literature has focused
on the role of diﬀerent political institutions in shaping economic policy and their eﬀects on
the economy. This literature, which by and large characterizes the macroeconomic side of
political economy, is well documented and surveyed in two excellent recent textbooks by
Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), and I do not touch upon it here.5
Another deﬁning feature of current research in political economy is the attempt to fully
integrate political actors and institutions with private decision-makers in a “general equilib-
3Another important book was Duncan Black’s The Theory of Committees and Elections,w h i c hw a s
published in 1958.
4This voluminous body of research explains, for example, why it is now common practice for textbooks
and handbooks in macroeconomics, public, international, and development economics, to name only a few
subjects, to include chapters devoted to political economy issues.
5See also the recent monographs by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2005).
2rium theory” of the political economy. Much of the recent literature on the microeconomic
side of political economy has been devoted to developing models where the set of individuals
(or voters), their preferences, and the set of available technologies (which include all the
technologies that pertain to the political process), are the only primitives, while politicians,
political parties, legislatures, interest groups, governments, and, ultimately, policies and con-
stitutions are equilibrium outcomes.6 While no general theory exists to date where all the
variables of interest are simultaneously determined in equilibrium, substantial progress has
been made to develop classes of models where each of these variables is treated as endogenous.
In this paper, I focus on four of the topics addressed by this literature, which correspond
to four of the basic building blocks of political economy. In particular, I start by analyzing
the behavior of voters in Section 2. In section 3, I then address the issue of endogenous
politicians. Next, I discuss the role of political parties in Section 4. In Section 5, I analyze
the formation and dissolution of coalition governments.7 For each of these topics I identify
and discuss some of the salient questions that have been posed and addressed in the literature,
present some stylized models and examples, and summarize the main theoretical ﬁndings.
Furthermore, I describe the available data, review the relevant empirical evidence, and discuss
some of the challenges for empirical research in political economy. Concluding remarks are
contained in Section 6.
2V o t e r s
At a fundamental level, voting is a cornerstone of democracy and citizens’ participation
and voting decisions in elections and referenda are fundamental inputs into the political
process that shapes the policies adopted by democratic societies. Hence, understanding ob-
served patterns of turnout and voting represents a fundamental step in the understanding
of democratic institutions. Moreover, from a theoretical standpoint, voters are the most
fundamental primitive of political economy models. Diﬀerent assumptions about their be-
6Two excellent books by Austen-Smith and Banks (1999, 2005) provide systematic accounts of the social-
choice and game theoretic foundations of this literature, respectively.
7The set of “players” which participate in the democratic policy-making process also include interest
groups. For an excellent monograph that presents a coherent theoretical framework to analyze the role that
special interest groups play in democratic politics, see Grossman and Helpman (2001).
3havior are bound to have important consequences on the implications of these models and,
more generally, on the equilibrium interpretation of the behavior of politicians, parties and
governments they may induce.
These considerations raise the following two fundamental questions: (i) Why do citizens
vote (or abstain from voting)? (ii) How do voters vote? In the remainder of this section, I
address each of these two questions in turn.
2.1 Turnout
As pointed out in the Introduction, much of what is new in political economy is the
application of modern methods of economic theory to problems that have been addressed
for a long time. The issue of understanding citizens’ participation in elections is one of these
problems.8 There is considerable (cross-section and time-series) variation in turnout both
within and across countries, as well as within and across types of elections.9 By and large,
the fractions of eligible voters who participate or abstain in any election at any time in any
modern democracy are both signiﬁcant.10 Also, participation and abstention rates are in
general not uniform in the population of eligible voters, but appear to be correlated with
several demographic characteristics, such as, for example, age, education, gender and race.11
Moreover, participation rates tend to increase with the importance of the election.12 These
are some of the most salient observations that emerge from the data.13
Can political economy explain these observations? The starting point of theoretical
research on voter turnout is represented by the “calculus of voting” framework, originally
8Henceforth, I use the word election to refer to any situation where eligible voters are asked to express
their opinion through voting. This also includes referenda.
9See, e.g., Blais (2000).
10In general, while various penalties for failing to vote exist in some countries, they tend to be rather
minimal and abstention is a noticeable phenomenon even where voting is compulsory (see, e.g., Blais (2000)).
11See, e.g., Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980).
12For example, turnout is generally higher in national than in local elections and referenda, and in presi-
dential elections than elections for other public oﬃces (see, e.g., Blais (2000)).
13Oﬃcial records of voter participation in elections are available at the aggregate level for most countries.
Survey data at the individual level are also available for a limited number of countries, including Australia,
Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. (see, e.g., Blais (2000)).
4formulated by Downs (1957) and later developed by Tullock (1967) and Riker and Ordeshook
(1968). According to this framework, given a citizenry of size N facing an election e where
there are two alternatives (e.g., two candidates or two policy proposals), citizen i ∈ N votes










and abstains otherwise. Here, pe
i is the probability that citizen i’s vote decides the election
(i.e., her vote is pivotal), Be
i is the (indirect) beneﬁt to citizen i associated with inducing her
desired electoral outcome, De
i is the (direct) beneﬁt from voting in election e, which includes
any beneﬁt citizen i may derive from fulﬁlling her civic duty of voting, and Ce
i is citizen i’s
cost of voting in election e.T h et e r m spe
iBe
i and De
i are often referred to as capturing the
instrumental (or investment) and expressive (or consumption) value of voting, respectively.




as fundamental components of a citizen’s preferences and are therefore treated as primi-
tives. Also, as long as the size of the electorate N is large, pe
i is typically thought of as
being virtually equal to zero, thus making the term pe
iBe
i negligible. Hence, to the extent
that (the unobservable) De
i and Ce
i are heterogeneous in the citizenry and correlated with
(observable) demographic characteristics, and their distributions (possibly conditional on lo-
cation and election speciﬁc characteristics) diﬀer across citizenries and elections, the model
can potentially account for the patterns observed in the data. At the same time, however,
since diﬀerences in behavior are mechanically induced by diﬀerences in preferences (which
are both exogenous and unobservable), the model fails to provide a theory that can explain
the evidence.
In light of this failure, most of the recent theoretical research on voter turnout has been
focused on developing models where pe
i, De
i and Ce
i are endogenous variables, derived in
equilibrium from more fundamental primitives. It is useful to divide these models in three




tively. Pivotal-voter models (e.g., Borgers (2004), Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1983, 1985)), endogenize the probability that a citizen’s vote is decisive. Ethical-voter mod-
els (e.g., Coate and Conlin (2004), Feddersen and Sandroni (2002) and Harsanyi (1980)),
endogenize the concept of civic-duty. Uncertain-voter models (e.g., Degan (2005), Degan
5and Merlo (2004), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) and Matsusaka (1995)), endoge-
nize a component of the cost of voting. For each class of models I present a simple example
that illustrates the main intuition and I discuss their general implications for interpreting
the empirical evidence.14
Pivotal-voter models: Consider the following example based on Borgers (2004) and Pal-
frey and Rosenthal (1985). A society has to decide between two alternatives, a and b,i na n
election e.T h e r ea r eN citizens, where N is large but ﬁnite, indexed by i ∈ {1,...,N}.T h e
citizenry is divided between supporters of a and supporters of b, where each citizen knows
the alternative she supports. The probability that each citizen is either a supporter of a
or b is equal to 1/2. This probability is known by all citizens. However, citizens do not
k n o wt h en u m b e ro fs u p p o r t e r so fe a c ha l t e r n a t i v e .I fa l t e r n a t i v ej ∈ {a,b} is implemented,
each supporter of j receives a utility beneﬁte q u a lt o1 while each supporter of the other
alternative incurs a utility loss equal to −1.
Citizens (simultaneously and independently) decide whether to vote or abstain. If they
choose to vote, they vote in favor of the alternative they support. Voting is costly and
citizens do not derive any direct beneﬁt from voting (that is, De
i =0for all i ∈ {1,...,N}).
Voting costs are independently and identically distributed in the citizenry according to a
uniform distribution on the support [0,1]. Each citizen i only knows her own voting cost Ce
i
and the distribution of voting costs in the population.
Since the probability pe
i that citizen i’s vote decides the election depends on the (endoge-
nous) composition of the electorate, this situation describes a game of incomplete informa-
tion, where the choice of whether or not to participate in the election is a strategic decision.
Given the number of citizens who participate in the election, the alternative j ∈ {a,b} that
receives a majority of the votes is implemented. In the event of a tie, each alternative is
implemented with probability 1/2.
In the environment described here, the only motivation for voting is the possibility of
aﬀecting the electoral outcome. Since many citizens share the same preferences for one
alternative over the other, and the electoral outcome is a public good, individuals may have
14For recent surveys on the literature on voter turnout see, e.g., Aldrich (1993), Feddersen (2004) and
Dhillon and Peralta (2002).
6an incentive to free-ride and abstain. On the other hand, however, there is an element of
c o m p e t i t i o nd u et ot h ef a c tt h a td i ﬀerent groups of citizens prefer diﬀerent alternatives. The
existence of such conﬂict provides an incentive for people to participate in the election. The
combination of these two opposing forces determines the equilibrium turnout and electoral
outcome.
Following the literature we look for a symmetric Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium of the game,
in which all citizens use the same cutoﬀ strategy, that is each citizen chooses to vote if and
only if her voting cost is below some critical level. Let C∗ denote the equilibrium cutoﬀ
level. To characterize C∗, consider the decision of a generic citizen i and let v be the ex
ante probability, before learning Ce
i, with which any individual votes given the equilibrium
strategy. Suppose the remaining N − 1 citizens are playing according to the equilibrium
strategy (that is, they vote if their cost is below C∗), and let σ denote the number of
individuals other than i who choose to vote. Note that the distribution of the random
variable σ is binomial with parameters N−1 and v. Since in equilibrium v =P r{Ce
i ≤ C∗} =
C∗, when the other N − 1 citizens are playing according to the equilibrium strategy, the











i (C∗) be the probability that citizen i’s vote is pivotal. Since alternative j ∈ {a,b}
is implemented for sure if a majority of the voters supports it and is implemented with
probability 1/2 in the event of a tie, citizen i’s vote is pivotal only if either her preferred
alternative is behind by one vote or the number of votes for each alternative is equal. In
either case, citizen i’s vote increases her expected utility by 1. In no other circumstance,
will her vote aﬀect the electoral outcome and, consequently, her expected utility. Hence,
pe
i (C∗) is the probability that the number of votes for i’s preferred alternative minus the




i (C∗). Since citizen i will want to vote only if pe
iBe
i exceeds her cost of
voting Ce






To compute the equilibrium we need to know the function pe
i (C∗),w h e r ew ek n o wt h a t
7pe
i (0) = 1 and pe
i (1) = 0.L e tπe
i(s) denote the probability that voter i is pivotal conditional
on the number of other voters being s.N o t e t h a t πe
i(0) = 1 and πe
i(1) = 1
2. In general, if
s ≥ 1 and s is odd, then citizen i’s vote is pivotal only if the number of other votes for her
preferred alternative is s−1
2 and the number of votes for the other alternative is s+1
2 .T h i s




























i (s) is non-increasing in s.I nf a c t ,i fs is odd
π
e














































i (s +1 )<π
e
i (s +1 ).
We can now use πe
i (s) to compute pe








































i (C∗) is strictly decreasing in C∗. The (strict) monotonicity of pe
i (C∗) derives from
t h ef a c tt h a ti n c r e a s i n gC∗ stochastically increases s (i.e., it increases the probability that
the number of other voters is relatively large) and πe















∂C∗ − 1 < 0,
there exists a unique C∗ ∈ (0,1) such that
Q(C
∗)=0 .
While a closed form expression for C∗ as a function of N cannot be derived, the value of
C∗ can easily be computed numerically for diﬀerent values of N. These calculations, reported




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0.18 if N =1 0 0
0.11 if N =5 0 0
0.05 if N =5 ,000
and as N →∞ , C∗ → 0.S i n c eC∗ denotes the equilibrium cutoﬀ level such that each citizen
chooses to participate in the election if and only if her voting cost is below the cutoﬀ, positive
turnout occurs in equilibrium. However, as the size of the electorate becomes large, turnout
decreases and in the limit everybody abstains.
While these results were obtained in the context of a very speciﬁc example, they extend
to more general environments and are typical of pivotal-voter models.15 Hence, pivotal-voter
models can in principle explain positive levels of participation in elections, but only when
the number of eligible voters is relatively small. For large electorates, on the other hand,
extending the calculus of voting framework by making pe
i endogenous in a game-theoretic
environment fails to provide a theory that can explain the empirical observations.
Empirical research has attempted to establish whether, holding everything else constant,
voter turnout increases with the expected closeness of an election, which relates to the
probability of being pivotal.16 By and large, evidence based on individual-level data shows
that this is not the case in large elections.17 Regardless of whether or not one believes that
this is a robust empirical ﬁnding, however, this is hardly a “test” of pivotal-voter models.
15See, e.g., Borgers (2004), Coate, Conlin and Moro (2004), Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1985).
16See, e.g., Matsusaka and Palda (1999) for a survey.
17See, e.g., Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975), Matsusaka and Palda (1993) and Kirchgaessner and Schulz (2005).
9Coate, Conlin and Moro (2004), on the other hand, directly address the question of whether
this class of models can explain voter participation in small-scale elections. Their analysis,
which is based on the structural estimation of a pivotal-voter model using data on local
referenda in Texas, shows that while the model is capable of predicting observed levels of
turnout quite well, at the same time it predicts closer electoral outcomes than they are in
the data. In other words, the only way the theory behind pivotal-voter models can explain
actual turnout, is if elections are very close, which makes their outcome very uncertain and
hence individual votes more likely to be pivotal. These circumstances, however, are not
consistent with what is observed in reality, thus leading to a rejection of this class of models
as useful tools to interpret the evidence.
Ethical-voter models: Consider the following example based on Coate and Conlin (2004).
For consistency of exposition, I use a formulation that is similar to that of the previous
example. A society has to decide between two alternatives, a and b, in an election e.T h e r e
is a continuum of citizens of measure one, where i denotes a generic citizen. The citizenry is
divided between supporters of a and supporters of b, where each citizen knows the alternative
she supports, but does not know the actual fraction of supporters of each alternative in the
population. From the point of view of a generic citizen i, the fraction of citizens who support
alternative a is the realization of a random variable µ which has a uniform distribution on
the support [0,1]. Hence, the expected fraction of citizens supporting each alternative is
equal to 1/2. If alternative j ∈ {a,b} is implemented, each supporter of j receives a utility
beneﬁte q u a lt o1 while each supporter of the other alternative incurs a utility loss equal to
−1.
Citizens have to decide whether to vote or abstain. If they choose to vote, they vote in
favor of the alternative they support. Voting is costly and voting costs are independently and
identically distributed in the citizenry according to a uniform distribution on the support
[0,1]. Each citizen i only knows her own voting cost Ce
i and the distribution of voting costs
in the population. The electoral outcome is determined by majority rule, where alternative
a is implemented if the fraction of votes in favor of a exceeds the fraction of votes in favor
of b.18
18Since there is a continuum of voters, ties are a measure zero event and can therefore be ignored.
10Citizens are ethical, in the sense that they are “group rule-utilitarians,” where a group is
deﬁned by which alternative a citizen prefers. More precisely, individuals follow the voting
rule that, if followed by everybody else in their group, would maximize their group’s aggregate
utility. Hence, each group’s optimal voting rule speciﬁes a critical voting cost such that all
individuals in the group whose voting cost is below the critical level should vote.
Let Ca and Cb denote the critical voting costs for the supporters of a and b, respectively. If
citizen i is a supporter of alternative j ∈ {a,b},s h ev o t e si fCe
i <C j and abstains otherwise.
Hence, the ex ante probability, before learning Ce




i <C j} = Cj










Alternative a is therefore implemented if
µCa > (1 − µ)Cb






In the environment described here, since there is a continuum of voters, no single vote
can ever be pivotal (that is, pe
iBe
i =0for all i). Hence, the only motivation for voting is
to fulﬁll one’s civic duty to “do the right thing.” The contribution of ethical-voter models
is to make this notion precise and characterize equilibrium voter turnout in game-theoretic
environments where citizens are rule-utilitarians.19 In particular, the key innovation of this
class of models is to assume that each citizen has an action (that is, either to participate in the
election or abstain) that is optimal for her to take on moral or ethical grounds, and receives
an additional payoﬀ from taking this action. Moreover, what is the ethical thing to do for
19For thorough discussions of the general notion of rule-utilitarianism, see Harsanyi (1980) and Feddersen
and Sandroni (2002).
11each citizen is not predetermined, but is instead endogenously derived as an equilibrium
outcome of a game.
In the context of the example, an equilibrium is given by a pair of critical costs, C∗
a and
C∗
b such that, for each j,j0 = a,b, j0 6= j, C∗
j maximizes the aggregate expected utility of
the group of supporters of alternative j given C∗
j0. To characterize the equilibrium, note that













































































































From the maximization of Ua (Ca,C∗
b) with respect to Ca ∈ [0,1] and the maximization of
Ub(C∗























b, we obtain that there exists a unique pair of (interior) equilibrium











12such that each citizen votes if her voting cost is below C∗ and abstains otherwise. Hence,
while a signiﬁcant fraction of the population of eligible voters abstains in equilibrium, voter
turnout may be substantial.
The main logic illustrated in the simple example also holds in more general environments,
where diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the beneﬁts citizens derive from various alternatives, the
distribution of the fraction of citizens who support them, and the distribution of voting
costs in the population generate interesting additional predictions.20 For instance, if in the
example we replace the assumption that the fraction µ of citizens who support alternative a
has a uniform distribution, with the alternative assumption that the density function of µ is
equal to 2µ (which implies that the expected fraction of citizens supporting alternative a is
equal to 2/3 instead of 1/2), we obtain that the equilibrium critical costs are C∗
a =0 .68 and
C∗
b =0 .85. Hence, equilibrium turnout is higher among the “minority” (that is, the group
with the smaller expected number of supporters).
These considerations suggest that ethical-voter models provide a promising framework to
confront the empirical evidence. Not only do they provide a theory that can explain observed
patterns of voter turnout, but they also place additional restrictions on the data that make
the theory falsiﬁable (from a Popperian perspective). An excellent example of using this
theory as a way to impose discipline on an empirical investigation of voter turnout in local
referenda is the article by Coate and Conlin (2004), who specify a group rule-utilitarian model
and structurally estimate it using data on local liquor referenda in Texas. Their analysis
shows that the estimated model is capable of reproducing all of the important features of
the data well and generates interesting implications for the interpretation of the evidence.
Uncertain-voter models: Consider the following example based on Degan and Merlo
(2004). As in the two previous examples, a society has to decide between two alterna-
tives, a and b, in an election e. To simplify exposition, it is convenient to formulate this
example in a spatial context, where alternatives correspond to positions on a unidimensional
ideological space (e.g., the liberal-conservative ideological spectrum), [−1,1].I np a r t i c u l a r ,
alternatives a and b are a pair of random variables which take values (ya,y b) ∈ Y = Ya ×Yb,
where Ya = {−1/2,−1/4,0} and Yb = {0,1/4,1/2}. The joint distribution of (a,b) on the
20See, e.g., Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2002).
13support Y , P = {p(ya,y b)}(ya,yb)∈Y,i ss u c ht h a tp(0,0) = 0 and p(ya,y b)=1 /8 for all
(ya,y b) 6=( 0 ,0).
There is a continuum of citizens of measure one, where i denotes a generic citizen. Each
citizen has a preferred ideology, or ideal point, yi ∈ [−1,1], and evaluates alternative ideolo-
gies y ∈ [−1,1] according to the payoﬀ function
ui (y)=−(yi − y)
2.
The distribution of preferred ideologies in the citizenry is uniform on the support [−1,1].
Citizens have to decide whether to vote or abstain, and if they vote, which alternative
to support. Each citizen i derives a direct beneﬁtf r o mv o t i n gb yf u l ﬁlling her civic duty,
De
i. These beneﬁts are distributed in the citizenry according to a uniform distribution on
the support [0,1]. Citizens do not know the realization (ya,y b) of the pair of alternatives
(a,b), but only know the distribution P. Clearly, because citizens are uncertain about the
alternatives in the election, they may make “voting mistakes” or, equivalently, vote for the



















be the (expected) cost for citizen i of voting for alternative a,w h e r e1{·} is an indicator
function that takes the value one if the expression within braces is true and zero otherwise.
This cost corresponds to the expected utility loss for citizen i i fs h ew e r et ov o t ef o rc a n d i d a t e



















is the (expected) cost for citizen i of voting for alternative b.
14Like in the previous example, since in the environment described here there is a continuum
of voters, no single vote can ever be pivotal (that is, pe
iBe
i =0for all i).21 Hence, the only
trade-oﬀ that is relevant in a citizen’s decision to participate in an election is the comparison
of the costs and beneﬁts of voting. In uncertain-voter models, the emphasis is on deriving
the cost of voting endogenously. In particular, voting may be costly because of citizens’
uncertainty (or lack of information) about the alternatives they are facing in an election,
which may lead them to make mistakes they may regret. The extent to which voting is
costly for diﬀerent citizens, and hence their propensity to participate in elections, will in
general depend on their ideological preferences relative to the distribution of the possible
alternatives they may be facing, as well as the their degree of uncertainty.
Following Degan and Merlo (2004), the decision problem of each citizen can be formulated
as a two-stage optimization problem, where in the ﬁrst stage the citizen decides whether or
not to participate in the election and, in the second stage, she decides who to vote for
(conditional on voting). To solve this problem we work backwards, starting from the last







a if Ci (b) >C i (a)
b if Ci (b) <C i (a)
a n di nt h ee v e n tt h a tCi (b)=Ci (a) citizen i randomizes between the two alternatives with
equal probability. Here, v∗
i (·)=j indicates that if citizen i were to vote, she would vote for
alternative j ∈ {a,b}. Using the expressions we derived above for Ci (a) and Ci (b),a n dt h e
deﬁnition of Y and P , we obtain that







a)p(ya,y b) − 2yi
X
(ya,yb)∈Y












a if yi < 0
b if yi > 0
21In other uncertain-voter models, like for example Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999), voters may be
pivotal. However, as I explained before, my primary objective here is to isolate the distinctive characteristic
of each class of models.
15and citizens with ideal points equal to zero randomize between the two alternatives with
equal probability.






Hence, in the ﬁrst stage, citizen i’s optimal participation rule is such that she participates if
Ce
i (·) <D e
i and abstains otherwise. To calculate the voting costs note that for each possible
realization (ya,y b) of (a,b), given the optimal voting rules of all citizens, we can determine
if a citizen would be making a mistake or not if she were to vote, and calculate the cost
associated with the mistake. If (ya,y b)=( −1/2,0), the cost is positive only for citizens with
−1/4 <y i < 0 (since they would vote for a but should instead vote for b), and is equal to
1/4+yi.I f(ya,y b)=( −1/2,1/4) the cost is positive only for citizens with −1/8 <y i < 0
(since they would vote for a but should instead vote for b), and is equal to 3/16+(3/2)yi.I f
(ya,y b)=( −1/4,0) t h ec o s ti sp o s i t i v eo n l yf o rc i t i z e n sw i t h−1/8 <y i < 0 (since they would
vote for a but should instead vote for b), and is equal to 1/16 + yi/2. The cost calculations
for the remaining four possible realizations of (a,b) are the same except that they apply to
citizens with positive ideal points (who could sometime be making mistakes by voting for b
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and citizens participate in the election if Ce
i (·) <D e
i and abstain otherwise. Note that while
citizens with relatively extreme ideal points always participate, all other groups of citizens
abstain to various degrees. In particular, the more “moderate” a citizen, the higher the
probability she will abstain.
Once again the results derived in this simple example generalize to more complicated
environments, and uncertain-voter models oﬀer a valid alternative to ethical-voter models
as useful tools for interpreting the empirical evidence.22 In fact, the class of uncertain-voter
22See, e.g., Degan (2005), Degan and Merlo (2004), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) and Matsusaka
(1995).
16models provides theoretical explanations for much of the evidence on voter turnout, relates
it to fundamentals, such as information and ideology, and places additional restrictions on
the data that can be used to validate the models. Degan and Merlo (2004), for example,
propose an uncertain-voter model to explain observed patterns of turnout and voting in
U.S. presidential and congressional elections. They structurally estimate the model using
individual-level data for the period 1970-2000, and use the estimated model to evaluate the
eﬀects of counterfactual experiments on electoral outcomes.
Their analysis implies a relationship between information and turnout (since uninformed
citizens are more likely to make “voting mistakes” and hence have larger expected costs
of voting, they abstain more than informed citizens), which can be quantiﬁed and related
to demographic characteristics. It also provides an explanation for the fact that, in every
presidential election year, we always observe more abstention in congressional elections than
in the presidential election, and some selective abstention (where some citizens vote in one
election, typically the one for president, but not in the other). Their estimates imply that
the average expected cost of voting in the presidential election is always smaller than in a
congressional election, which is due to the fact that, in general, there is more information,
and hence less uncertainty, about presidential candidates than congressional candidates.
2.2 Voting
The second fundamental issue I address in this section of the paper has to do with the
way voters vote. In particular, I am interested in the way the political economy literature
has addressed the question of whether citizens vote “sincerely” or “strategically.” In order
to even understand this question, we have to start by deﬁning what sincere and strategic
behavior mean in the context of voting. Consider a situation where a society of size N is
facing an election e where there are M ≥ 2 alternatives and each citizen i =1 ,...,N has a
(strict) preference ranking of these alternatives. Putting aside the issue of abstention (e.g.,
think of a situation where De
i >C e
i for all i ∈ {1,...,N}), citizens vote sincerely if they cast
their vote in favor of the alternative they most prefer, independently of what other citizens
do. They vote strategically if their voting decision is a best-response to what other citizens
do.
17Clearly, the notion of strategic voting is intimately related to the (endogenous) probability
that a vote is decisive (which I already touched upon in the context of pivotal-voter models,
where abstention, rather than whom to vote for, is the strategic decision). Also, if citizens
vote strategically, the characterization of the equilibria of a voting game depends on the
voting rule which is used to determine the outcome of the election and on the equilibrium
concept which is chosen to solve the game. Both of these aspects have been extensively
addressed in the literature and I will not discuss them here.23 Instead, I will brieﬂy discuss
the restrictions that sincere and strategic voting place on the data and their implications for
interpreting the empirical evidence.
In the context of the situation described above, if we consider a single (isolated) election
where there are only two alternatives, sincere and strategic voting are equivalent, since voting
sincerely is the unique undominated decision for each citizen.24 In other words, since sincere
and strategic voting induce the same voting proﬁles, and hence the same outcomes, they
are observationally equivalent. This implies that there are no restrictions coming from the
theory that allow a researcher to use only data on how voters vote in a single election where
there are only two alternatives to discriminate among alternative models. In such context,
identiﬁcation must rely on additional data. Also, the issue of model validation should not
be addressed solely on the basis of within-sample ﬁt, but should also rely on the comparison
of the relative out-of-sample performance of alternative models.
The equivalence between sincere and strategic voting, however, breaks down as soon as
there are more than two alternatives. This can be easily illustrated with a simple textbook
example taken from Moulin (1986). Consider a situation where a society of size N =3is
facing an election e where there are 3 alternatives, a, b and c, and citizens i =1 ,2,3 have
the following (strict) preference orderings. Citizen 1 prefers a to b to c;c i t i z e n2 prefers c to
a to b;a n dc i t i z e n3 prefers b to c to a. All citizens vote and the alternative that receives the
largest number of votes is implemented. In the event of a tie, the vote of citizen 1 determines
the outcome of the election.
23See, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (2005), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), Myerson (1999, 2000,
2002), and Myerson and Weber (1993).
24See, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (2005).
18If voting is sincere, the votes of the three citizens are characterized by the vector (a,c,b),
where the ith component corresponds to the vote of citizen i =1 ,2,3, and the electoral
outcome is that alternative a is implemented. If, on the other hand, voters vote strategically,
t h eg a m eh a s5 pure strategy Nash equilibria, where the equilibrium voting proﬁles are
(a,c,c), (a,a,a), (a,a,b), (b,b,b),a n d(c,c,c) and the corresponding equilibrium electoral
outcomes are c, a, a, b,a n dc, respectively. Note that the sincere voting proﬁle (a,c,b)
is not a Nash equilibrium. Also, only in two of the equilibria (i.e., (a,c,c) and (a,a,b)),
no citizen is voting for her least preferred choice. Moreover, the only equilibrium that
survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies is (a,c,c), where alternative c is
implemented. To see that this is the case, notice that if citizens 2 and 3 vote for the same
alternative, that alternative is implemented regardless of citizen 1’s vote, while if they vote
for diﬀerent alternatives, citizen 1’s vote determines the electoral outcome. Hence, to vote
for a is a weakly dominant strategy for citizen 1. Next, notice that for citizen 2 it is a weakly
dominated strategy to vote for her least preferred alternative, b, since by voting for either a
or c s h ee i t h e rd o e sn o ta ﬀect the electoral outcome or induces an electoral outcome which
is better for her than b. A similar argument implies that it is a weakly dominated strategy
for citizen 3 to vote for her least preferred alternative, a.T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v et h a ta f t e rt h e
ﬁrst round of deletion citizen 1 votes for a, citizen 2 votes for a or c, and citizen 3 votes for b
or c. But given these possibilities, it is weakly dominated for citizen 3 to vote for b,s i n c eb y
doing so she would induce the electoral outcome that she least prefers, where alternative a
is implemented. Hence, citizen 3 votes for alternative c and it is therefore optimal for citizen
2 also to vote for alternative c which is then implemented.
The lesson we learn from this example is twofold. On the one hand, minimal deviations
from the “canonical” environment where there is a single election with two alternatives
are likely to generate situations where sincere voting and strategic voting are no longer
observationally equivalent. In fact, this is in general true even when we consider elections
with only two alternatives, but where either the same election is repeated through time
(e.g., presidential elections in the U.S.), or there are multiple simultaneous elections that
are interrelated (e.g., presidential and congressional elections in the U.S.). In all of these
situations, strategic considerations are likely to induce voters to vote diﬀerently than what
19would be predicted by sincere behavior, and may lead to diﬀerent electoral outcomes. In
principle, diﬀe r e n tt h e o r i e sm a yt h e r e f o r ei m p o s ed i ﬀerent restrictions on the data, which
can then be used to provide discipline in assessing the empirical relevance of various models.
On the other hand, however, by and large strategic-voting models have multiple equilibria,
and their predictions often diﬀer (sometime dramatically) across equilibria. In fact, the set
of Nash equilibria of a voting game may include virtually all possible voting proﬁles and
electoral outcomes. The multiplicity is more severe the larger the size of the electorate and
is a common feature of large voting games regardless of the solution concept that is used.
Moreover, as already pointed out with respect to the issue of abstention, the probability that
a voter is pivotal becomes minuscule in large electorates, thus making strategic calculations
less relevant. These considerations impose serious challenges on the use of strategic-voting
models to explain the empirical evidence and severely limit the possibility of taking them to
the data. Sincere-voting models, on the other hand, are typically very tractable and tend
to generate sharp predictions that can be compared with the data. In order to evaluate the
limitations of sincere-voting models, it seems therefore useful to try to assess the extent to
which sincere-voting models may fail to explain certain aspects of the data
To address this issue, I present here a simple calculation, related to the work by Degan
and Merlo (2004), aimed at assessing empirically the extent to which sincere voting can
account for observed patterns of voting in an environment where strategic voting is typically
thought of as being necessary to explain the evidence.
Consider the situation faced by U.S. voters in a presidential election year, where presiden-
tial and congressional elections occur simultaneously.25 A prominent feature that emerges
from the data is that often people vote a “split ticket” (that is, they vote for candidates
of diﬀerent parties for President and for Congress). The table below, which reports the
distribution of observed voting proﬁles in presidential and congressional elections in each
presidential election year between 1970 and 2000, documents this fact.26 In the table, the
25In the United States, citizens are called to participate in national elections to elect the President and
the members of Congress. While congressional elections occur every two years, the time between presidential
elections is four years.
26The data comes from the American National Election Studies which contain individual-level information
on how people vote in presidential and congressional elections for a representative (cross-section) sample of
20ﬁrst entry in the voting proﬁle refers to the vote in the presidential election and the second
to the vote in the congressional election, and a D (R) indicates voting for the Democratic
(Republican) candidate.
Voting proﬁl e s1 9 7 21 9 7 61 9 8 01 9 8 41 9 8 81 9 9 21 9 9 62 0 0 0
DD 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.45
DR 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.09
RD 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.07
RR 0.43 0.36 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.30 0.39 0.39
The sizeable presence of split-ticket voting in the data has been interpreted by many
as direct evidence of strategic voting, and has lead to the development of strategic-voting
models that can explain some of the aggregate stylized facts.27 However, before embracing
the notion that in order to explain split-ticket voting one needs to resort to strategic voting,
it is useful to ask whether this observed phenomenon can also be explained as the natural
outcome of the aggregation of individual decisions of citizens with heterogeneous ideological
preferences. In other words, the relevant empirical question is: To what extent can sincere
voting account for split-ticket voting?
To answer this question, note that while the presidential election is nation-wide (that is,
all citizens face the same set of candidates regardless of where they reside), congressional
elections are held at the district level (that is, citizens residing in diﬀerent congressional
districts face diﬀerent sets of candidates).28 Suppose that the positions of all candidates can
be represented as points in the unidimensional ideological space [−1,1], and that citizens
have single-peaked (Euclidean) preferences over this space, with the peaks representing their
ideal points. Hence, it is in principle possible that candidates’ positions are such that some
voters in some districts have ideal points that are closer to the candidate representing one
the American voting-age population.
27See, e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 1996) and Chari, Jones and Marimon (1997).
28Consistent with the existing literature on split-ticket voting, I restrict attention to House elections, which
are held every election year for every district. Hence, each citizen faces both a presidential election as well
as a House election. Senate elections, on the other hand, are staggered and only about a third of all states
have a Senate election in any given election year.
21party in one election and at the same time to the candidate representing the other party in
the other election. Some citizens may therefore sincerely vote for the Republican candidate
for President and the Democratic candidate for Congress or vice versa.
This argument is illustrated in the ﬁgure below for arbitrary candidates’ positions, where
DH (RH)a n dDP (RP) are the positions of the Democratic (Republican) candidate running
for the House and the Presidency, respectively. Note, however, that for any conﬁguration of
candidates’ positions sincere voting is consistent with only three of the four possible voting
proﬁles (except for a measure zero event where the voters are indiﬀerent between two proﬁles
and therefore randomize). Hence, sincere voting can fail to account for some (or possibly
all) of the instances of split-ticket voting observed in the data.
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Sincere Split-ticket voting
To perform this calculation I use two sources of data: the American National Election
Studies (NES) and the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space Scores.29 For each
relevant year (that is, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2000), in addition to
the individual voting decisions in presidential and congressional elections of a representative
sample of the voting age population, the NES contains information on the congressional
29Both data sets are available online at http://www.umich.edu/~nes and http://voteview.uh.edu/basic
.htm, respectively.
22district where each individual resides, the identity of the Democratic and the Republican
candidate competing for election in his or her congressional district, and whether any of the
candidates is an incumbent in that district.30 Using data on roll call voting by each member
of Congress and support to roll call votes by each President, Poole and Rosenthal developed a
methodology to estimate the positions of all politicians who ever served either as Presidents
or members of Congress, on the liberal-conservative ideological (common) space [−1,1].31
These estimates, which are comparable across politicians and across time, are contained in
their NOMINATE Common Space Scores data set.32
Given the two data sets, each voter in the NES sample for each presidential election year
is matched with the positions of the candidates running in his or her congressional district
that year. If one of the two candidates is an incumbent, his position is assumed to be known
and is given by his NOMINATE score. For the challengers, on the other hand, I assume that
their positions are not known but are drawn from populations of potential candidates whose
distributions are known. In particular, I assume that the positions of challengers are drawn
from the empirical distributions of the NOMINATE scores for Democratic and Republican
members of Congress and I allow these distributions to diﬀer across regions in the U.S.33 In
30For thorough discussions of potential limitations of the survey data in the NES see, e.g., Anderson and
Silver (1986), Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980) and Wright (1993). Note, however, that the NES represent
the best and most widely used source of individual-level data on electoral participation and voting in the
U.S.
31For a discussion of potential limitations of the methodology proposed by Poole and Rosenthal see, e.g.,
Heckman and Snyder (1997). For a comparison of alternative estimation procedures see Clinton, Jackman and
Rivers (2001). Note, however, that none of the other procedures has been used to generate a comprehensive
data set similar to the one by Poole and Rosenthal.
32Details about the methodology and the data are available on-line at http://voteview.uh.edu/basic.htm.
See also Poole and Rosenthal’s “D-Nominate after 10-years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political
Economic History of Roll Call Voting” at http://voteview.uh.edu/prapsd99.pdf. Note that the Poole and
Rosenthal NOMINATE data set also contains estimates of the positions of politicians on a second dimension,
which I do not use here. In fact, according to Poole and Rosenthal (1997), after 1970 the second dimension
has become irrelevant and “roll call voting again became largely a matter of positioning on a single, liberal-
conservative dimension” (p. 5).
33Note that it would be unfeasible to characterize non-parametrically a separate distribution function for
23addition, in each presidential election all voters face the same set of candidates and their
positions are assumed to be known and given by their NOMINATE scores.
Given the positions of the candidates faced by each voter in the NES sample, I then
calculate whether the observed voting proﬁle of each voter is consistent with sincere voting.
Since straight-ticket voting is always consistent with sincere voting, I only report the fraction
of split-ticket voting that can be explained by sincere voting. The results of this calculation
are reported in the following table.









As we can see from this table, sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-
level observations on voting behavior in U.S. national elections in the data. Its worst “failure”
amounts to the inability of accounting for 3% of the observations (i.e., 20% of 17% of the
sample) in 1996. As “errors” of this magnitude are way within the margin of tolerance
when one allows for sampling (or measurement) error, I conclude that a compelling case
cannot be made on empirical grounds to dismiss a sincere-voting interpretation of split-
ticket voting in favor of more complicated explanations that rely on strategic voting. More
generally, I believe that strategic-voting models provide a coherent analytical framework
to understand the potential eﬀects of strategic interactions among citizens in a political
economy, and their importance should not be evaluated based on their empirical performance.
On the other hand, sincere-voting models, while perhaps less sophisticated, often provide a
each party in each state (let alone each district), since the number of representatives of either party in each
state in any given year is small.
24useful theoretical guide to analyze the data and interpret the evidence, and their empirical
performance should be assessed ﬁrst, before resorting to more sophisticated, but often less
tractable, models.
3 Politicians
The very existence and functioning of representative democracy, where citizens delegate
policy-making to elected representatives, hinge on the presence of politicians. In his famous
1918 lecture entitled Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber writes:
“Politics, just as economic pursuits, may be a man’s avocation or his vocation.
[...] There are two ways of making politics one’s vocation: Either one lives ‘for’
politics or one lives ‘oﬀ’ politics. [...] He who lives ‘for’ politics makes politics
his life, in an internal sense. Either he enjoys the naked possession of the power
he exerts, or he nourishes his inner balance and self-feeling by the consciousness
that his life has meaning in the service of a ‘cause.’ [...] He who strives to make
politics a permanent source of income lives ‘oﬀ’ politics as a vocation.” [from
Gerth and Mills (1946; pp. 83-84)]
The view expressed by Weber is indicative of the way in which early research in political
economy approached the study of politicians. By taking the existence of politicians as given
(that is, by treating them as a primitive), the main objective of this literature has been for a
long time that of addressing the following question: What are the motivations of politicians?
Starting with Downs (1957), a long tradition in political economy builds on the assump-
tion that the main objective of politicians is to win an election. Within this framework,
known as the “downsian” paradigm, (oﬃce-concerned) opportunistic candidates shape their
policy platforms to please the (policy-concerned) electorate, so as to maximize their proba-
bility of winning in order to collect the rents of public oﬃce. Several authors, however, have
challenged this view by proposing alternative theories where politicians are assumed to be
policy-motivated (e.g., Alesina (1988), Hibbs (1977) and Wittman (1977, 1983)). Within
this framework, known as the “partisan” paradigm, candidates choose their policy platforms
by trading-oﬀ their policy preferences with their desire to win the election in order to aﬀect
25policy outcomes.34
A major turning point in the literature occurred when researchers started to challenge the
basic assumption that the set of political candidates competing for public oﬃce is exogenous.
This challenge deﬁnes most of the current political economy research on this topic and
has generated an alternative approach to the study of politicians known as the “citizen-
candidate” paradigm (e.g., Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)).
This framework removes the artiﬁcial distinction between citizens and politicians which is
prevalent in the other approaches, by recognizing that elected oﬃcials are selected by the
citizenry from those citizens who choose to become politicians and stand as candidates in
an election in the ﬁrst place. By doing so, this approach makes the question of what are the
motivations of politicians moot. Since politicians are citizens, their preferences can no longer
be speciﬁed in an ad hoc fashion, separately from the speciﬁcation of the preferences of voters.
In other words, the preferences of elected politicians must be represented in the citizenry.
At the same time, the citizen-candidate framework poses two new important questions: (i)
Who chooses to become a politician? (ii) What are the payoﬀs from becoming a politician?
In light of these considerations, in this section of the paper I ﬁrst illustrate the logic of the
citizen-candidate approach by presenting a simple example and discussing the implications of
diﬀerent assumptions about voters’ behavior. The assumption that voters vote strategically
or sincerely constitutes in fact one of the main diﬀerences between the citizen-candidate
environment considered by Besley and Coate (1997) and the one by Osborne and Slivinski
(1996). I then address the empirical question of what are the returns to an individual from
being a politician. Finally, I present the results of ongoing research on dynamic equilibrium
models of political careers.35
34For a clear description of the two paradigms see, for example chapters 3 and 5 in Persson and Tabellini
(2000).
35Another important line of research which is not considered here concerns the behavior of elected politi-
cians and the extent to which voters can discipline them in the context of an agency-theoretic framework with
moral hazard and adverse selection. Important contributions to this literature include Banks and Sundaran
(1993, 1998), Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997). For an excellent
survey of the recent literature, see Besley (2005).
263.1 The Citizen-Candidate Framework
Consider the following example based on Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and
Slivinski (1996). A society has to elect a representative to implement a policy y in the
unidimensional policy space Y =[ −1,1]. There is a large, ﬁnite number of citizens, indexed
by i ∈ {1.....,N}, which, for expositional convenience, can be approximated by a continuum
of measure one.36 Citizens evaluate alternative policies y ∈ [−1,1] and monetary payoﬀs
z ∈ R according to the (indirect) utility function
Ui (y,z)=ui (y)+z
where
ui (y)=−(yi − y)
2 ,
and yi ∈ [−1,1] denotes citizen i’s most preferred policy. The distribution of ideal points in
the citizenry, which is common knowledge, is uniform on the support [−1,1]. This implies
that the median ideal point is equal to 0.
Citizens (simultaneously and independently) decide whether to become candidates in the
election. Running for public oﬃce entails a cost C ∈ (0,1/6]. After all citizens have made
their entry decision, the ideal point of each candidate is observed by all citizens. Since
candidates cannot commit in advance to a policy, a candidate’s ideal point represents the
policy he would implement if elected.
Given the set of candidates, all citizens (simultaneously and independently) vote for one
of the candidates. The candidate who wins a plurality of the votes is elected and implements
his most preferred policy. In addition, the elected politician receives a payoﬀ B ∈ [2C/3,2C),
which represents the rents from holding public oﬃce. In the event of a tie, a random draw
among the tieing candidates selects the winner. If nobody runs as a candidate every citizen
gets a utility of −1.
If a generic citizen i chooses to run for election, his payoﬀ is equal to
ui (yi)+B − C = B − C
36In particular, the probability that each vote is pivotal is non-zero (although potentially very small).
27if he is elected and
ui (yj) − C = −(yi − yj)
2 − C
if another citizen j is elected. If, on the other hand, he chooses not to run, his payoﬀ is equal
to
ui (yj)=−(yi − yj)
2
if a citizen j is elected, or −1 in the event that no citizen runs for election.
We distinguish between two cases that correspond to two alternative assumptions about
the behavior of voters. In the ﬁrst case, citizens are assumed to vote sincerely (i.e., each
citizen votes for his most preferred candidate, and if there are k candidates all with the same
ideal point y, then each of these candidates receives a fraction 1/k of the votes of all citizens
whose ideal points are closer to y than to the ideal points of any other candidate). In the
second case, citizens vote strategically (i.e., each citizen’s voting strategy is a best response
to the voting strategies of all other citizens, and no citizen uses weakly dominated voting
strategies).37
While the model admits equilibria with diﬀerent number of candidates, I focus on equi-
libria where only two citizens run for election.38 Before considering the characterization of
two-candidate equilibria in each of the two cases, recall that sincere and strategic voting
are equivalent when there are only two alternatives. This implies that in all equilibria with
two candidates, each citizen votes for his most preferred candidate (regardless of whether
out of equilibrium voters vote sincerely or strategically). Since running for election is costly,
it is also true that in any equilibrium no citizen ever runs unless either he has a positive
probability of winning, or he aﬀects the electoral outcome by running (regardless of the
number of equilibrium candidates). The combination of these two results implies that in all
two-candidate equilibria, each candidate must win with equal probability and, therefore, the
37The ﬁrst case is the one considered by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and the second by Besley and Coate
(1997).
38Given the parameterization of the example, there also exist equilibria where only one candidate runs
unopposed. However, equilibria with more than two candidates do not exist. They are instead possible in
the general formulation of citizen-candidate models (see, Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski
(1996)).
28ideal points of the citizens who run as candidates must be symmetric around the median
of the distribution of ideal points in the citizenry, 0. It follows that, in all two-candidate
equilibria, the ideal points of candidates, and hence the two possible policy outcomes, are
described by a vector (−y∗,y∗). Also, it follows from this discussion that any diﬀerence in
the properties of two-candidate equilibria between the model with sincere voting and the
one with strategic voting arises from diﬀerences in the out-of-equilibrium behavior of voters.
In particular, in order to characterize two-candidate equilibria we must consider the devia-
tion where a third citizen may decide to run as candidate, and the voters’ response to this
deviation is diﬀerent in the two cases.












To see that this is the case, note that the lower bound on y∗ is given by the fact that each
candidate must ﬁnd it optimal to run (and win with probability 1/2), rather than let their
opponent run uncontested (and win for sure). Since running is costly, for a citizen to ﬁnd it
optimal to run, it must be that the ideal point of the other citizen running is far enough from
his own ideal point. Otherwise, he may prefer to delegate the policy choice to his opponent.































The upper bound on y∗, on the other hand, derives from the fact that in all two-candidate
equilibria each candidate must win with positive probability (in fact, with probability 1/2).
39Assume that ties are broken in favor of running.
29This requires that the ideal points of the two candidates cannot be too far apart from each
other. Otherwise, a citizen with the median ideal point would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to run and
win the election for sure. In fact, if a citizen with ideal point equal to 0 enters and wins, his
payoﬀ is equal to B−C.I f ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,h ed o e sn o tr u na g a i n s tt h ep a i ro fc a n d i d a t e s
















Hence, since y∗ ≥
p
(2C − B)/4,a n dB ∈ [2C/3,2C),i ti sa l w a y st r u et h a t−y∗2 ≤ B −C ,
which implies that the citizen with median ideal point would always want to run if he could
be sure of victory. However, if he were a sure loser, it would never be proﬁtable for him
t or u n( s i n c eh ew o u l dn o ta ﬀect the policy outcome and would have to pay the cost of
running).40
Hence, the upper bound on y∗ is derived by ﬁnding the value y such that a candidate
w i t hi d e a lp o i n te q u a lt o0 would receive 1/3 of the votes if he were to run against a pair
of candidates with ideal points (−y,y). Since the density of ideal points in the citizenry is

















which implies that y =2 /3. Finally, note that if a citizen with ideal point equal to 0 were to
run against a pair of candidates with ideal points (−2/3,2/3), the outcome of the election
would be a three-way tie. Since the citizen would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to run, it follows that
y∗ < 2/3.41
Strategic voting: When voters vote strategically, the set of two-candidate equilibria is
40Note that it is also true that no other citizen with ideal point between −y∗ and y∗ would want to run
as a sure loser. In fact, if his ideal point is closer to y∗ (−y∗), his decision to run would induce the policy
outcome −y∗ (y∗), which is always worse for him than the lottery between −y∗ and y∗.




























The lower bound on y∗ is obtained from the same argument that was used above, which does
not depend on how citizens vote. In order to explain why, if citizens vote strategically, it is
also an equilibrium for two citizens with ideal points (−y∗,y∗) such that y∗ ∈ [y,1] to run,
consider the following argument. Suppose that y∗ = y, and consider the possible deviation
where a citizen with ideal point equal to 0 decides to run as a candidate. Would enough
citizens strategically vote for the new candidate to make it proﬁtable for him to run? Not
necessarily. In fact, recall that with only two candidates, the voting population splits their
vote 50/50 between the two candidates with ideal points (−y,y) and each voter votes for
the candidate he most prefers. Then, if no citizen uses weakly dominated voting strategies,
it is a Nash equilibrium for the voters to continue to split their vote 50/50 between the two
candidates with ideal points (−y,y). In this equilibrium, the candidate with ideal point 0
does not receive any vote and hence chooses not to run, thus supporting the two-candidate
equilibrium where y∗ = y. To see that this is the case, note that it is a weakly dominated
strategy for any citizen whose ideal point is closer to 0 than to either −y or y to switch his
vote and vote for the candidate with ideal point 0 instead.42 By doing so, since the ideal
point of such switching voter must be between −y and y, the voter would change the electoral
outcome against the candidate he was supporting before the switch, and would therefore be
worse oﬀ.43 Clearly, no citizen with ideal point outside the interval (−y,y) would want to
switch his vote either. Similar arguments also apply for all y∗ ∈ [y,1].
While citizens with relatively extreme ideal points cannot be elected (and therefore never
run), if citizens vote sincerely, a situation where two candidates whose policy preferences are
at the opposite ends of the spectrum compete for election may be an equilibrium if citizens
vote strategically. The set of two-candidate equilibria under sincere and strategic voting,
however, also share some common features. In particular, to the extent that running for
oﬃce is costly, no two candidates will share the same ideal point, and the higher the cost
42Note that this is what sincere voting would prescribe.
43The “weak” qualiﬁer derives from the fact that all citizens with ideal point equal to 0 are indiﬀerent
between −y and y and would therefore remain indiﬀerent after breaking the tie.
31relative to the beneﬁt the larger the minimum distance between the two candidates.
The simple parametric example considered here illustrates some of the appealing features
of the citizen-candidate framework. By treating electoral candidates as endogenous equilib-
rium objects, citizen-candidate models provide useful theoretical foundations for addressing
the question of who becomes a politician. In particular, the “type” of citizens who choose to
run for public oﬃce in equilibrium, and hence the characteristics of elected representatives,
are a function of the relative costs and beneﬁts of becoming a politician, as well as the pref-
erences of the citizenry. While in the original speciﬁcation proposed by Besley and Coate
(1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) citizens only diﬀer with respect to their policy pref-
erences, the basic structure can also be extended to richer environments which encompass
additional dimensions of heterogeneity.44 More generally, the citizen-candidate framework
represents a useful analytical tool that is both ﬂexible and tractable, and can be generalized
to address a number of interesting issues in political economy.45
3.2 Private Returns to Political Experience
The previous discussion highlighted the importance of the relative costs and beneﬁts of
electoral success to analyze the incentives of politicians, and raises a fundamental question:
What are the returns to an individual from a career in politics? The beneﬁts of public oﬃce
include both instantaneous payoﬀs (which are realized upon electoral success), as well as
future payoﬀs (which accrue over time and depend on current and future decisions). Also,
these payoﬀs have a monetary (observable) component (e.g., the salary while in oﬃce or
future wages in other occupations), and a non-pecuniary (unobservable) component (e.g.,
the beneﬁt from participating in the policy-making process and possibly aﬀecting policy
outcomes).
In order to focus attention on the dynamic aspects of the career decisions of politicians,
consider the situation faced by an elected representative in his ﬁrst term in oﬃce. At the
44See, e.g., Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004) and Poutvaara and Takalo (2003).
45Several models based on the citizen-candidate approach have already been proposed in the literature to
study a variety of issues including, for example, lobbying (e.g., Besley and Coate (2001) and Felli and Merlo
(2004)), parties (e.g., Levy (2004) and Morelli (2004)), coalition governments (e.g., Bandyopadhyay and Oak
(2004)), and ineﬃcient public policy (e.g., Besley and Coate (1998)).
32risk of oversimplifying, consider a simple example where the horizon of the dynamic decision
problem is two periods. In the ﬁrst period, the politician has to decide whether to run for
reelection. In the second (and last) period, if he is still in oﬃce, in addition to rerunning
for his oﬃce the politician has also the opportunity of running for a higher oﬃce. If the
politician leaves politics (either voluntarily or via electoral defeat), he works in the private
sector for the remainder of the time.
The political oﬃce currently occupied by the politician pays a per-period salary S and
generates a per-period beneﬁt B. Moreover, if the politician is successful in implementing
his most preferred policy, he receives an additional beneﬁt P. Similarly, the payoﬀsi nt h e
higher oﬃce are S0 >S , B0 >B ,a n dP0 >P . The cost of running for election, C,i s
normalized to zero. Private sector wages increase with political experience. Let e ∈ {1,2}
denote an individual’s political experience (i.e., the number of periods he has served in a
political oﬃce), and We his per-period wage in the private sector, where S<B+ S<
W1 <B 0 + S0 <W 2 <B+ S + P<B 0 + S0 + P0 =2 ( B + S + P),a n d(W2 − W1) >
(W1 − (B + S)). Suppose there is no discounting.
Politicians diﬀer with respect to their electoral skills, which aﬀect their probability of
winning an election. Let j ∈ {b,g} denote the individual’s electoral type, πj his probability
of being reelected, and π0
j his probability of winning an electoral bid for higher oﬃce, where
0=π0
b <π b = 1
2 = π0
g <π g =1 . Politicians also diﬀer with respect to their policy
skills, which aﬀect their probability of successfully implementing their most preferred policy.
Let k ∈ {l,h} denote the individual’s policy type and pk the per-period probability of
implementing his most preferred policy while in oﬃce, where 0=pl <p h =1 . Hence, there
are four possible types of politicians denoted by τ =( j,k) ∈ {(b,l) ,(b,h) ,(g,l) ,(g,h)}.
To analyze the politician’s dynamic optimization problem, consider ﬁrst the decision he
faces in the last period (i.e., t =2 ). If the politician decides to run for reelection, his expected
payoﬀ is equal to
πj (S + B + pkP)+( 1− πj)W2,













33and to W2 if he decides to voluntarily leave oﬃce. Clearly, the politician’s optimal de-
cision depends on his type τ.I f τ =( g,h) the politician runs for higher oﬃce (since
(S0 + B0 + P0)/2+W2/2 >S+ B + P>W 2); if τ =( b,h) he runs for reelection (since
S + B + P>W 2); and if τ =( b,l) or τ =( g,l) he exits politics (since S + B<W 2). Let
V2 (τ) denote the expected continuation payoﬀ of an individual of type τ given his optimal
period-2 decision. We have that
V2 (τ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1
2 (S0 + B0 + P0)+1
2W2 if τ =( g,h)
1
2 (S + B + P)+1
2W2 if τ =( b,h)
W2 if τ =( b,l)
W2 if τ =( g,l)
Consider now the decision problem of the politician when t =1 . His expected payoﬀ is
equal to
πj (S + B + pkP + V2 (τ)) + (1 − πj)2W1
if he runs for reelection, and 2W1 if he exits. Note that, since (W2 − W1) > (W1 − (B + S)),
the politician always runs for reelection, independently of his type. Let V1 (τ) denote the
expected payoﬀ of an individual of type τ at the time of his election to public oﬃce given
his optimal period-1 decision. We have that
V1 (τ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(S + B + P)+1
2 (S0 + B0 + P0)+1




S + B + P + 1
2 (S + B + P)+1
2W2
¢
+ W1 if τ =( ( b,h))
1
2 (S + B + W2)+W1 if τ =( ( b,l))
S + B + W2 if τ =( ( g,l))
It may therefore be optimal for a politician to remain in a particular oﬃce for a while and
then either attempt to get elected to a higher oﬃce or leave politics altogether.
As illustrated in this simple example, current and future beneﬁts from public oﬃce are
likely to aﬀect the behavior of politicians. However, the eﬀects will in general be diﬀerent
depending on what are the relative magnitudes of the various components of the returns
to an individual from a career in politics. Also, diﬀerent components are likely to aﬀect
diﬀerent politicians in diﬀerent ways, depending on their (observable and unobservable)
characteristics. These considerations suggest that in order to improve our understanding of
34the career decisions of politicians it is important to quantify the private returns to political
experience.
This empirical question is the focus of the work by Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005),
who specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of the U.S. Congress, and
estimate this model using a newly collected data set that contains detailed information on
all members of Congress in the post-war period.46 A novel feature of the data is that it
incorporates information about post-congressional employment and salaries when members
exit Congress, which allows them to estimate the returns to congressional experience in post-
congressional employment. The framework they propose also allows estimation of the relative
importance of the utility politicians derive from being in oﬃce and the monetary returns to
a career in Congress. Using data on important legislative achievements by members of
Congress, they relate part of the non-pecuniary rewards from serving in Congress to the
desire for policy accomplishments. Using the estimated model, they also investigate the
extent to which politicians’ career choices respond to wage incentives.
As in the simple example illustrated above, the model of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo
(2005) takes into account that the decision of a member of Congress to seek reelection is likely
to depend not only on current payoﬀs, which depend, in turn, on the probability of winning
today, but also on the option value of holding the seat. This option value may depend, among
other things, on the probability of being named to a committee, as well as the probability
of winning a bid for higher oﬃce in the future (e.g., a member of the House may run for
a seat in the Senate). Their empirical framework also incorporates politicians’ unobserved
heterogeneity (both with respect to their electoral ability and policy eﬀectiveness), and
observed characteristics (like, for example, their age, state of birth, educational background,
family background, party aﬃliation, and prior political experience), into the analysis of their
career choices.
For the purpose of the discussion in this section of the paper, there are two main empirical
ﬁndings of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) that are important. First, congressional ex-
perience signiﬁcantly increases post-congressional wages in the private sector. In particular,
they ﬁnd that, holding everything else constant, winning reelection in the House (Senate)
46For a detailed description of the data see Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004).
35for the ﬁrst time increases post-congressional wages in the private sector by 4.4% (16.7%).
However, the marginal eﬀect of congressional experience on post-congressional wages dimin-
ishes quite rapidly with additional experience: averaging over members’ actual experience
levels, the marginal eﬀect on post-congressional wages of an additional term in the House
(Senate) is equal to 2.4% (5.2%).
Second, the non-pecuniary rewards from being in Congress are rather large (especially in
the Senate). They ﬁnd that general non-pecuniary rewards amount to over $200,000 per year
for a senator and about $30,000 per year for a representative (in 1995 constant dollars).47 In
addition, non-pecuniary rewards from achieving an important legislative accomplishment are
comparable for representatives and senators and are both quite large (i.e., about $350,000
and $400,000, respectively). These ﬁndings suggest that policy motivations and beneﬁts of
oﬃce play important roles in the career decisions of politicians. In particular, monetary
returns alone (that is, wages in Congress and post-congressional payoﬀs), cannot explain the
observed behavior of politicians, and the eﬀect of the congressional wage on their behavior
is quite modest.
3.3 Political Careers
An interesting feature of the data analyzed by Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) is
that a signiﬁcant fraction of the members of the U.S. Congress leaves oﬃce voluntarily and
becomes employed in the private sector. At the same time, many senators and representatives
remain in Congress until retirement. Out of all the members who entered Congress after
1945 and left by 1994, 47% left voluntarily. Of these, 42% took a job in the private sector,
while the remaining 58% either moved to a diﬀerent political oﬃce (35%), or retired (23%).48
Furthermore, the politicians who exit Congress voluntarily and leave politics altogether for
another occupation tend to have successful careers in the private sector. For example, average
annual earnings of these individuals in the above sample are equal to $254,207 (in 1995
constant dollars).
47To provide a term of comparison, note that the average annual salary of a member of Congress in 1995
dollars over their sample period (i.e., 1947-1994), is equal to $120,378.
48Of the 53% who left Congress because of electoral defeat, 61% took a job in the private sector, 35% took
another political job, and 4% retired.
36These observations are not unique to Congress or the United States.49 By and large, there
are two main career paths that are prevalent among politicians: there are career politicians
(i.e., individuals who spend their entire working life in politics), and political careers (i.e.,
there are politicians who eventually leave politics and work in the market sector).50 What
explains these diﬀerent career paths?
In order to explore this issue, consider the following example based on Mattozzi and
Merlo (2005a). Consider a political economy where there are two sectors: a market sector
and a political sector. In every period t =0 ,1,... a large, ﬁnite number of citizens is born,
which, for convenience of exposition, can be approximated by a continuum of measure one.
Each individual lives for two periods.
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability m and their political
skills p.W e l e t m ∈ {l,h},w h e r em = l (m = h ) denotes an individual with low (high)
market ability. A measure (1 − φ) ∈ [3/4,1) of the population is high market ability with
probability α =1 /4 and has no political skills, that is p =0 .A m e a s u r e φ ∈ (0,1/4]
of the population is heterogeneous with respect to their political skills p ∈ [0,1],w h i c ha r e
distributed according to a uniform distribution. The probability of being high market ability











where π(p) ∈ [1/4,3/4]. Hence, the fraction of individuals with high market ability condi-
tional on having political skills is equal to 1/2 while the fraction of individuals with high
market ability in the overall population is (1 + φ)/4 ≤ 5/16. We assume that each individual
only knows his own political skills, and does not know his market ability. Also, φ, π (p),a n d
the distribution of political skills in the citizenry are all common knowledge.
In each period of life, an individual can either work in the market sector or be a politician.
Political skills have no direct value in the (perfectly competitive) market sector. Let wl =0
and wh = w ≥ 1 denote the competitive market wages associated with each ability level. If
49See, e.g., Best and Cotta (2000).
50A third possible career path is to start in the private sector and then move into politics. While there
are several recent examples of this phenomenon (e.g., Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or Michael Bloomberg in the
United States), this is still a relatively rare occurrence.
37an individual works in the market sector, during his ﬁrst period of employment his ability is
revealed with probability 1/2 (while with probability 1/2 it remains unknown).
The political sector is characterized by a single political oﬃce that pays a politician a
per-period salary s,w h e r es ∈ (w/5,w/4). While in oﬃce, a politician with political skills p
performs a public service which beneﬁts all citizens and generates a per-capita payoﬀ which
depends on his political skills, B(p)=p.
T h e r ei sas i n g l ei n ﬁnitely-lived political party that in each period when the political oﬃce
is vacant can nominate an individual for the political oﬃce. While in oﬃce, a “partisan”
politician (that is, a politician nominated by the political party) generates private beneﬁts
to the political party which depend on the politician’s political skills and political experience






0 if e =1
√
p
2 if e =2
where e denotes a politician’s number of terms in oﬃce or political experience.52
Since, when an individual nominated by the party serves in the political oﬃce, he becomes
a partisan politician, we assume that the beneﬁt zP (p,e) is shared between the party and
the politician. Hence, if in any given period the political party nominates an individual who
serves in the political oﬃce, the party’s payoﬀ is zP (po,e o)−τP,w h e r epo and eo denote the
political skills and experience of the politician in oﬃce, respectively, and τP ≥ 0 denotes the
transfer the politician receives from the party in that period.53 Otherwise, the party’s payoﬀ
in that period is equal to zero. Let δ ≥ 1/2 be the party’s discount factor.
An individual may also become a politician and serve in the political oﬃce without being
nominated by the party (that is, an individual may become an “independent” politician).
While in oﬃce, an independent politician generates private beneﬁts for himself denoted by
51For example, the politician engages in fund-raising activities on behalf of the political party. Alterna-
tively, while in oﬃce the politician has access to graft and corruption opportunities that generate revenues
for the political party.
52A politician may need time to establish himself and become known (fund-raised) or powerful (corruption).
Obviously, the more skilled the politician the higher the revenues he generates for his party.
53These transfers may be thought of as valuable positions within the party organization that the party
can allocate among its politicians (e.g., committee membership, group leadership, etc.).
38zI (p,e)=zP (p,e).54
There is no borrowing or saving. If in any given period a politician with skills po is in
oﬃce, his payoﬀ in that period is equal to s+τP if he is a partisan, where the no borrowing
constraint implies that τP ≤ zP (po,e o),a n ds + zI (po,e o) if he is an independent. Since
zP (po,1) = 0, it follows immediately that a ﬁrst-term partisan politician receives no transfer
from the party.
The political mechanism that determines the appointment (and possible re-appointment)
of an individual to the political oﬃce and the timing of the model are as follows.55 Con-
sider ﬁrst a situation where no politician is in oﬃce (that is, the political oﬃce is vacant).
Individuals can enter into politics only in their ﬁrst period of life. Then at the beginning
of the period all individuals born in that period (simultaneously and independently) decide
whether or not to apply to become a partisan politician. If the pool of applicants is non
empty, the party observes the political skills of a randomly drawn individual from this pool.56
After observing the political skills of the selected applicant, the party decides whether to
nominate that individual for the political oﬃce, or reject the selected applicant and forgo
the opportunity of nominating somebody for the political oﬃce for that period.
If the party nominates a politician, then the party’s nominee is either approved or not
approved by the voters according to majority rule. Only individuals in their second period of
life vote. If the politician nominated by the party is approved by a majority of the voters, he
is then in oﬃce for that period, while all other individuals become employed in the market
54Like a partisan politician, an independent politician may have access to opportunities to raise money in
a variety of ways, but may need time to establish himself.
55Note that the speciﬁc political mechanism considered here is not meant to resemble any particular
electoral or appointment rule observed in a speciﬁc democracy. Rather it is intended to capture some general
features of such rules. For example, in many democracies political representatives are elected according to
closed list PR, where individuals vote for a party and not an individual candidate. Even in political systems
where politicians are elected according to plurality rule in single-member districts (like the U.S.), many seats
are often "safe" for a political party regardless of the identity of the candidate. Also, several political oﬃces
are ﬁlled by appointment (e.g., state supreme court judges), where a party’s nominee can either be conﬁrmed
or rejected by the voters.
56Since the number of individuals is ﬁnite, given the pool of applicants, the probability that each applicant
is selected is always positive (although potentially very small).
39sector. If, on the other hand, the politician nominated by the party does not receive the
approval of a majority of the voters, or the party does not propose a nomination, then all
individuals in their ﬁrst period of life (simultaneously and independently) decide whether
or not to run for the political oﬃce as independents. If the set of candidates running as
independents is non-empty, a random draw then determines who will be in oﬃce for that
period, while all other individuals become employed in the market sector.57 If nobody runs,
then the political oﬃce remains vacant for a period.
During a politician’s ﬁrst term in oﬃce, his political skills become publicly observable
(and hence are observed by the voters and also by the market sector). At the beginning
of the next period, the voters then decide by majority rule whether or not to conﬁrm the
incumbent politician for a second term in oﬃce. The incumbent politician also receives
an oﬀer of employment from the market sector at a competitive wage conditional on his
observed political skills. If the incumbent politician is not conﬁrmed by the voters, he accepts
employment in the market sector and all individuals born in that period (simultaneously and
independently) decide whether or not to run for the political oﬃce as independents. If the
set of candidates running as independents is non-empty, a random draw then determines who
will be in oﬃce for that period, while all other individuals become employed in the market
sector. If nobody runs, then the political oﬃce remains vacant for a period.
If, on the other hand, the incumbent politician is conﬁrmed by the voters, he then decides
whether to remain in the political oﬃce or accept employment in the market sector. If an
incumbent politician with political skills po is a partisan, his payoﬀ from remaining in oﬃce
includes a share of the beneﬁt he generates to the party, zP (po,2).58 For simplicity, we
assume that the politician’s share is equal to the minimum between his reservation wage in
the market sector net of the political salary and the entire beneﬁt.59
57Note that since political skills are private information, all individuals running as independents are ex
ante identical from the point of view of the voters. Also, since the number of individuals is ﬁnite, given the
set of individuals who run as independent, the probability that each one of them is selected is always positive
(although potentially very small).
58Recall that if the incumbent politician is instead an independent, his payoﬀ from remaining in oﬃce is
equal to s + zI (po,2).
59This assumption corresponds to a situation where the party and the politician bargain over the beneﬁt
40If a conﬁrmed politician chooses to remain in oﬃce for a second (and last) term, all other
individuals (including all of the members of the new generation born in that period), work in
the market sector. If, on the other hand, a conﬁrmed politician chooses to leave the political
oﬃce and accept employment in the market sector, the political oﬃce becomes vacant and
the party can then propose a new nominee for the political oﬃce in that period.
Following Mattozzi and Merlo (2005a), we characterize the unique Markov Perfect Equi-
librium of this game. To characterize the equilibrium, ﬁrst note that, since the market sector
is competitive, it pays each individual according to his expected market ability. If an indi-













(since political skills are not observed by the market and the fraction of individuals with
high market ability in the overall population is (1 + φ)/4), and his expected second-period













(since his market ability is revealed after one period of employment with probability 1/2).
Hence, the expected (lifetime) earnings of an individual with political skills p who chooses a












If an individual with political skills p is nominated by the party and approved by the
voters, his ﬁrst-period earnings in the political sector are equal to s (since he receives no
ﬁrst-period transfer from the party). His second-period earnings, regardless of whether or
not he remains a politician, are instead equal to π(p)w. This follows from the fact that, since
during a politician’s ﬁrst term in oﬃce his political skills become observable, he could then
work in the market sector at a wage equal to π(p)w. Hence, conditional on being conﬁrmed
by the voters, he will be willing to remain in politics only if his second-period earnings in
the political sector, s + τP, are at least as large as π(p)w, which implies that, as long as
and the party has all the bargaining power.
41zP (p,2) − (π(p)w − s) ≥ 0, τP = π(p)w − s. Hence, the expected (lifetime) earnings of
an individual with political skills p who becomes a partisan politician (and may either be a










It follows that an individual with political skills p w o u l dl i k et ob en o m i n a t e db yt h e






























where p∗ ∈ (0,1).
The condition that guarantees that an incumbent politician would be willing to remain















which implies that, conditional on being conﬁrmed by the voters, partisan politicians will
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.
Note that 0 <p 0 <p ∗ <p 00 < 1.
Now consider the decision faced by an individual with political skills p when there is an
opportunity to run for the political oﬃce as an independent. If the individual becomes an
independent politician, his ﬁrst-period earnings are equal to s.I f h e i s t h e n c o n ﬁrmed by
the voters, his second-period earnings are equal to s + zI (p,2) if he remains a politician,
and π(p)w if he leaves the political sector and works in the market sector instead. His
second-period earnings are also equal to π(p)w if he is not conﬁrmed by the voters. Since
42zI (p,2) = zP (p,2), it follows from our earlier calculations that, if oﬀered the opportunity,
all individuals with p ≥ p∗ would like to run as independent regardless of whether or not
they serve for two terms. On the other hand, all individuals with p ∈ [p0,p ∗) would like to
do so only if they are then conﬁrmed by the voters to a second term. Once in oﬃce, only
independent politicians with political skills p<p 00 would be willing to serve for a second
term rather than work in the market sector.
Turning attention to the equilibrium strategy of voters when deciding whether to conﬁrm
an incumbent politician, note ﬁrst that when the voters vote, they know the politician’s
skills. Also, they know that if they choose not to conﬁrm the incumbent, they can ﬁll
the political oﬃce with a random draw from the set of individuals who would be willing
to run as independents. Hence, voters will never conﬁrm an incumbent politician whose
political skills are below the skills of an average independent politician. Given the argument
above, this implies that if an individual with political skills p0 were to run as independent,
he would not be reappointed. In fact, this is true for all individuals with political skills
p<(1 + p0)/2. Therefore, the only individuals who would be willing to run as independent
are those with political skills p ∈ [p∗,1], who would do so in order to reveal their political
skills, independently of whether or not they could serve in oﬃce for two terms. This implies
that in equilibrium, voters will conﬁrm incumbent politicians only if their political skills are











Note that 0 <p 0 <p ∗ < e p<p 00 < 1.
With respect to the equilibrium strategy of voters when deciding whether to approve a
candidate nominated by the party, note that when the voters vote, they do not know the
nominee’s skills. Hence, they will vote in favor of the party’s nominee only if their equilibrium
beliefs (which of course depend on the equilibrium strategy followed by the party), are such
that his expected political skills are greater than or equal to e p.
We can now characterize the equilibrium nomination strategy of the party. Recall that
the party observes the political skills of a random draw from the set of individuals who
apply to the party and has to decide whether to nominate that individual for the political
oﬃce, or reject the selected applicant and forgo the opportunity of nominating somebody
43for the political oﬃce for that period. Let ρ denote the lowest political skills of an applicant
such that the party nominates him for the political oﬃce. Let V P be the party’s expected
equilibrium continuation payoﬀ in the subgame starting with a ﬁrst-term partisan politician
in oﬃce. Finally, let V I be the party’s expected continuation payoﬀ in the subgame starting
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First recall that no individual with political skills p<p ∗ would want to become a politi-
cian. Next, note that if the applicant’s political skills are p ∈ [p∗, e p),i ft h ep a r t yd e v i a t e s
from the candidate equilibrium strategy and chooses to nominate him, the party’s payoﬀ
is equal to δV I. This follows from the fact that the partisan nominee would be approved
and hence serve a ﬁrst term in oﬃce (which generates a payoﬀ equal to zP (p,1) = 0). The
partisan incumbent, however, would not be conﬁrmed for a second term, thus leading to the
appointment of an independent. If, on the other hand, the party chooses not to nominate
the applicant, its payoﬀ is equal to V I >δ VI.
Suppose now that the applicant’s political skills are p ∈ [e p,p00). It the party deviates
from the candidate equilibrium strategy and chooses not to nominate him, the party’s payoﬀ
is equal to V I. If, on the other hand, the party chooses to nominate the applicant, he would
serve two terms in oﬃce, and the party’s payoﬀ is equal to δ
¡




>VI (for δ ≥ 1/2).
Finally, consider the case where the applicant’s political skills are p ∈ [p00,1].I t t h e
party deviates from the candidate equilibrium strategy and chooses not to nominate him,
the party’s payoﬀ is equal to V I. If, on the other hand, the party chooses to nominate the
60This expression follows from observing that after an independent is in oﬃce, the party has a chance of
proposing a new nominee in the next period only if the independent leaves oﬃce voluntarily (an even which
occurs with probability (1−p00)/(1−p∗)), or in the period after that if the independent politician serves for
two terms (which happens with probability (p00 − e p)/(1 − p∗)).
44applicant, he would serve for one term and then voluntarily leave oﬃce to work in the market
sector, and the party’s payoﬀ is equal to δV P >VI.
In equilibrium, it is therefore the case that only individuals with political skills p ∈ [e p,1]
apply to become partisan politicians, and the party always nominates a randomly selected
applicant for the political oﬃce. Partisan nominees are always approved by the voters to a
ﬁrst term in oﬃce and conﬁrmed to a second term. All partisan politicians with political
skills p ∈ [e p,p00) are career politicians (i.e., they spend their entire life working in the political
sector), while if p ∈ [p00,1] they have political careers (i.e., they start oﬀ by working in the
political sector but then switch to the market sector). An illustration of the equilibrium is
depicted in the ﬁgure below, where CP denotes career politicians and PC political careers.
 











A few remarks about the interpretation of the equilibrium are in order. Politicians are
valuable to the party only if they are approved and conﬁrmed by the voters. If their political
skills are between e p and p00 they are valuable because in their second term in oﬃce they
generate rents for the party. If their political skills are above p00 they are valuable because
they allow the party to maintain control of the political oﬃce (in spite of the fact that they
do not generate any rents for the party). Hence, individuals with relatively high political
skills use the party to reveal their skills and obtain high market wages. At the same time,
the party is happy to nominate them since they enhance the party’s reputation with the
45voters. This reputation eﬀect emerges from the following equilibrium mechanism. On the
one hand, voters want politicians with political skills as high as possible. On the other hand,
the party wants politicians who generate positive rents for the party. In equilibrium, the
party performs a valuable service to the voters by preventing politicians with relatively low
political skills from getting in oﬃce (although they would still generate rents for the political
party if they could get conﬁrmed to a second term),61 and by supporting the nomination of
politicians with relatively high political skills (although they don’t generate any rents for the
party). In exchange, the voters reappoint partisan politicians with average political skills











denote the average skills of a ﬁrst-term politician and
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the average skills of a career politician, in equilibrium. Note that increasing the salary of
oﬃce holders, s, decreases the average quality of politicians, but increases the average quality
of career politicians and decreases turnover in oﬃce. On the other hand, an increase in the
market wage for individuals with high market ability, w, increases the average quality of
politicians, but decreases the average quality of career politicians and increases turnover in
oﬃce.
The ﬁrst set of results derives from the fact that when the political salary increases,
politics becomes relatively more attractive an option for all levels of political skills, thus
l o w e r i n gt h eq u a l i t yo ft h ew o r s tp o l i t i c i a n .A tt h es a m et i m e ,h o w e v e r ,t h ep a r t yc a nn o w
aﬀord to retain relatively better politicians, since the additional amount it has to pay to
keep them in oﬃce for each level of political skills is now lower. This increases the quality
of the best career politician and decreases turnover. An increase in the market wage also
has two eﬀects. First, it makes the signalling motive for individuals with relatively higher
political skills (and hence higher expected market ability) stronger. In other words, it makes
61Note that politicians with political skills p ∈ [p∗, e p) would receive the voters’ approval and hence serve
one term in oﬃce if the party were to nominate them.
46it more valuable for individuals with relatively higher political skills to reveal them, and
for individuals with relatively lower political skills not to do so, thus increasing the quality
of the worst politician. At the same time, however, it makes the market sector relatively
more appealing for all levels of political skills, thus making it more diﬃcult for the party
to retain politicians with high skills. This decreases the quality of the best career politician
and increases turnover.62
To conclude this section of the paper, note that the framework proposed by Mattozzi and
Merlo (2005a) also provides a rationale for the existence and survival of political parties, to
which I turn attention next.
4P a r t i e s
Political parties represent another fundamental institution of representative democracy,
and have long been recognized as key players by the political economy literature (see, e.g.,
Downs (1957)). However, the question “what is a party?” in political economy is as diﬃcult
and elusive as the question “what is a ﬁrm?” in industrial organization. The boundaries
between political parties and interest groups or other citizens’ organizations, for example,
are rather blurry, and it is conceptually diﬃcult to discriminate among alternative deﬁnitions
of parties. It should therefore not be surprising that not much progress has been done to
date to provide a compelling answer to this important question. In fact, as compared to the
other topics discussed in this paper, the study of political parties as endogenous equilibrium
institutions is still in its infancy.
Most of the recent political economy literature on parties has tried to “unbundle” these
institutions by focusing on speciﬁc purposes parties serve, thus providing alternative (com-
plementary) rationales for their existence. Among all the possible purposes of parties that
have been considered in the literature, I focus here on three that are closely related to the
topics of the previous sections of the paper. These are the mobilization of voters (e.g.,
Herrera and Martinelli (2004), Morton (1991), Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999) and Uhlaner
62Using diﬀerent models, Besley (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004) also
consider the eﬀects of an increase in the compensation of elected oﬃcials on their average quality. While both
Besley and Caselli and Morelli ﬁnd that when politicians are paid better their average quality necessarily
increases, Messner and Polborn ﬁnd that it may either increase or decrease.
47(1989)), the choice of policy platforms (e.g., Levy (2004), Morelli (2004) and Testa (2004)),
and the selection of politicians and the choice of electoral candidates (e.g., Caillaud and
Tirole (2002), Carrillo and Mariotti (2001), Mattozzi and Merlo (2005a, 2005b) and Snyder
and Ting (2002)).63 For each of these issues, I present a simple example based on a model
drawn from the literature to illustrate possible ways of modelling the role of parties. Since it
is not clear what kind of empirical evidence is most relevant to study political parties, I do
not attempt here to relate theoretical and empirical research on this topic, or to emphasize
speciﬁc features of the data.64
4.1 Voter Mobilization
Before elections, parties are often observed to engage in costly activities aimed at “bring-
ing out their base.” To explore the role of parties vis-a-vis the mobilization of voters, consider
the following example based on the model by Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999). A society has to
decide between two alternatives, a and b,i na ne l e c t i o ne. There is a continuum of citizens of
measure one, where i denotes a generic citizen. The citizenry is divided between supporters
of a and supporters of b, where the fraction of citizens who support alternative a is the (un-
known) realization of a random variable µ which has a uniform distribution on the support
[0,1]. Hence, the expected fraction of citizens supporting each alternative is equal to 1/2.
Citizens have to decide whether to vote or abstain. If they choose to vote, they vote in
favor of the alternative they support. Voting is costly and voting costs are independently and
identically distributed in the citizenry according to a uniform distribution on the support
63Other functions performed by parties include the organization and coordination of electoral campaigns
(e.g., Osborne and Tourky (2004)), the formation of bargaining coalitions in the legislature (e.g., Jackson
and Moselle (2002), and disciplining the behavior of elected representatives (e.g., Alesina and Spear (1988)
and Harrington (1992)).
64Most of the empirical literature on parties has tried to assess whether parties aﬀect the roll-call voting
behavior of senators and representatives in the U.S. Congress (see, e.g., Cox and McCubbins (1993), Cox
and Poole (2002) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997)). Stylized facts about political parties concern for the
most part their relative number across diﬀerent political systems (see, e.g., Lijphart (1999)). Note that
there is also a large theoretical literature on the equilibrium number of parties (originated by the work of
Duverger (1954)), which I do not consider in this paper. See, e.g., Cox (1997) for an excellent overview of
this literature and of the empirical evidence.
48[0,1],w h e r eCe
i denotes the voting cost of a generic citizen i. The electoral outcome is
determined by majority rule, where alternative a is implemented if the fraction of votes in
favor of a exceeds the fraction of votes in favor of b.65
There are two parties, Pa and Pb, where party Pj, j ∈ {a,b}, supports alternative j.I f
alternative j is implemented, party Pj obtains a beneﬁte q u a lt oB ∈ (0,1] and 0 otherwise.
Parties can spend eﬀort (or, equivalently, invest resources) to motivate citizens to vote. If
party Pj, j ∈ {a,b},i n v e s t sIj to try to convince j’s supporters to vote, the beneﬁtt oa
generic citizen i who supports alternative j from participating in the election (and voting
for alternative j), is equal to
B
e








j ∈ (0,1] is the (publicly known) direct beneﬁt to a citizen supporting alternative j









and abstain otherwise. The cost to party Pj of investment Ij is equal to C (Ij)=I2
j/2.
This implies that, given the parties’ investments Ia and Ib, the expected fraction of the

















and the probability that alternative a is implemented is equal to
πa (Ia,I b)=P r {µexp(Ia + D
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w h i c hi si n c r e a s i n gi np a r t yPa’s investment Ia, and decreasing in party Pb’s investment Ib.
65Since there is a continuum of voters, ties are a measure zero event and can therefore be ignored.
49Hence, each party chooses its optimal investment in voter mobilization taking into account
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where 0 <I ∗
a = I∗
b <B . Clearly, the more parties care about the outcome of the election
(i.e., the higher B), the more resources they will invest in trying to convince citizens who
share their views to vote. More interestingly, the more similar the extent to which supporters
of the two alternatives care about the outcome of the election (i.e., the smaller |De
a − De
b|),
the more parties will invest resources to mobilize voters. The intuition for this result is
that, at the margin, the return to the investment is higher the closer the election, since the
probability of swinging the election in the desired direction is higher. Since in equilibrium
both parties behave the same way, however, the eﬀorts by the two parties oﬀset each other
and do not aﬀect the electoral outcome.
4.2 Policy Platforms
At a very basic level, parties are groups of politicians. While members of the same party
are in general more likely to share similar views than members of diﬀerent parties, these
groups are by no means homogeneous. It is therefore legitimate to wonder whether parties
matter, in the ex ante sense of imposing some discipline on the policy platforms of their
50representatives, or their existence can simply be rationalized as an ex post agglomeration of
like-minded politicians. In order to explore this issue, consider the following example taken
from Levy (2004).
A society has to elect a representative to implement a policy (y1,y 2) in the two-dimensional
policy space Y = Y1×Y2, Y1 = Y2 =[ −1,1]. There is a continuum of citizens of mass one di-
vided into three separate groups of equal size (i.e., each group contains 1/3 of the citizenry),
where j ∈ {a,b,c} denotes a generic group of citizens. All citizens within the same group
have the same preferences, and citizens in group j ∈ {a,b,c} evaluate alternative policies






















∈ Y denotes group j’s most preferred policy, or ideal point, and ya =
(−1,−1), yb =( 1 ,1),a n dyc =( −1,1).
One citizen in each group is a politician (with the same preferences as all other citi-
zens in the group). Hence, let j ∈ {a,b,c} also denote the politician from group j.T h e
three politicians are organized into parties, and the ﬁve possible party conﬁgurations are:
({a},{b},{c}) (which denotes that each politician is in a separate party), ({a,b},{c}) (which
denotes that politicians a and b are in the same party, while politician c is in a separate party),
({a},{b,c}), ({a,c},{b}),a n d({a,b,c}).
Parties (simultaneously and independently) choose whether or not to compete in the
election and, if so, which policy platform to propose. Decisions within each party are made
by unanimity rule. If all the members of a party are indiﬀerent between running and not
running, the party does not run. If a party competes in the election a partisan politician
runs as its representative. Since there are no direct beneﬁts from holding oﬃce and, if
elected, a politician implements his party’s platform, the choice of the party’s representative
is inconsequential.
The set of policy platforms a party can propose is represented by its Pareto set (i.e., the
set of feasible policies that are eﬃcient from the point of view of the party). Hence, the role
of parties here is to expand the set of policies politicians can oﬀer when they run for oﬃce.
Recall that in the citizen-candidate framework, politicians cannot commit to implement
51any policy other than their ideal point. In this environment, on the other hand, parties
can commit to implement any policy, as long as it is eﬃcient for its members (and hence
enforceable after the election). Let k ∈ {{a},{b},{c},{a,b},{a,c},{b,c},{a,b,c}} denote
a generic party and Pk its Pareto set. We have that P{a} =( −1,−1), P{b} =( 1 ,1), P{c} =
(−1,1), P{a,b} = {(y1,y 2):y1 = y2 ∈ [−1,1]}, P{a,c} = {(−1,y 2):y2 ∈ [−1,1]}, P{b,c} =
{(y1,1) : y1 ∈ [−1,1]},a n dP{a,b,c} = {(y1,y 2):y1,y2 ∈ [−1,1],y 1 ≥ y2}.
Given the set of parties running for election and their policy platforms, citizens vote
sincerely (i.e., they vote for the platform they most prefer, and if they are indiﬀerent they
vote for the party which includes their politician). The platform that receives the largest
number of votes is then implemented by the elected representative of the party proposing
the platform.
Following Levy (2004), the equilibrium characterization proceeds in two steps: (i) for any
given party conﬁguration, solve for the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the platform game
and determine which policy platforms are implemented; (ii) derive the set of equilibrium
party conﬁgurations, where a party conﬁguration is an equilibrium if it is stable (i.e., it is
such that no politician, or group of politicians wants to quit its party and form a smaller
one, thus inducing a diﬀerent equilibrium policy outcome).
Equilibrium platforms: Suppose the party conﬁguration is ({a},{b},{c}). Hence, if
party {j}, j ∈ {a,b,c}, runs its policy platform is yj. Note that the citizens in group a
strictly prefer yc to yb (since ua (−1,1) = −4 >u a (1,1) = −8), and similarly, the citizens
in group b strictly prefer yc to yb. Therefore, in equilibrium the politician in party {c} runs
unopposed and the policy platform (−1,1) is implemented.
Next, suppose the party conﬁguration is ({a,b},{c}). Hence, if party {a,b} runs it
can oﬀer policy platforms in the set {(y1,y 2):y1 = y2 ∈ [−1,1]}, while if party {c} runs







, the citizens in group a strictly prefer such policy to (−1,1) (since
ua (y,y)=−2(−1 − y)







, the citizens in group b strictly prefer such policy to (−1,1) (since ub (y,y)=
−2(1− y)
2 >u b(−1,1) = −4). Therefore, in equilibrium one of the two politicians in








,w h i c hi s
52implemented.
Consider now the case where the party conﬁguration is ({a,c},{b}).N o t et h a ti fp a r t y
{a,c} oﬀers any policy platform in its Pareto set {(−1,y 2):y2 ∈ [−1,1]}, the citizens in
groups a and c strictly prefer such policy to (1,1) (the preference is weak for citizens in
groups c if y2 = −1). Therefore, in equilibrium one of the two politicians in party {a,c} runs
unopposed and oﬀers a policy platform (−1,y 2),w h e r ey2 ∈ [−1,1], which is implemented.
Similarly, if the party conﬁguration is ({b,c},{a}), in equilibrium one of the two politicians
in party {b,c} runs unopposed and oﬀers a policy platform (y1,1),w h e r ey1 ∈ [−1,1],w h i c h
is implemented. Finally, if the only party is {a,b,c},t h e na n yp o l i c yp l a t f o r mi nP{a,b,c} can
be oﬀered and implemented in equilibrium.
Equilibrium party conﬁgurations:P a r t yc o n ﬁguration ({a},{b},{c}) is stable by deﬁni-
tion. Party conﬁguration ({a,b},{c}) is stable, since neither politician a nor politician b can
gain by leaving party {a,b} and forming their own parties; the break-up of the party would in
fact lead to the policy outcome (−1,1).P a r t yc o n ﬁgurations ({a,c},{b}) and ({b,c},{a})
are stable only if the platform that is oﬀered is (−1,1); otherwise, in either case politician c
would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to leave its party and form his own party, thus inducing the policy
outcome (−1,1). Finally, party conﬁguration {a,b,c} is stable only if the platform that is
oﬀered is (0,0), which is the only platform that prevents either politicians a and b to form
a party together or c to form his own party (note that (0,0) is the platform in the set of
equilibrium policies of party {a,b} that maximizes the utility of politician c).
T h em a i nc o n c l u s i o nw ed r a wf r o mt h i si n s i g h t ful example (which extends to the general
environment considered by Levy (2004)), is that parties may matter. By imposing discipline
on the policy platforms that are oﬀered by their politicians in an election, parties may
aﬀect equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, the partisan policy platforms that are
implemented may diﬀer from any of the ideal points of the politicians, which are the only
possible policy outcomes in the absence of parties.
4.3 Political Recruitment
As already discussed in section 3.3, parties play an important role in the selection of
candidates for a variety of public oﬃces. However, as pointed out by Diermeier, Keane and
53Merlo (2005) in the context of legislative careers in the United States and, more generally,
by Best and Cotta (2000) and Norris (1997) for many other countries, the involvement of
individuals in politics often begins quite early in their adult life. Moreover, relatively few
individuals start oﬀ their political careers by running for a public oﬃce. More frequently,
they “test” their political aspirations by holding positions within party organizations, which
represent “breeding grounds” from which many successful politicians are eventually drawn.
Since political recruitment is an important activity parties engage in and its outcome
aﬀects the “pool” of potential candidates running for election, a signiﬁcant issue concerns
the (endogenous) quality of the set of individuals who are recruited by parties. Also, while
intra-party competition for potential recruits may exist, at a more general level the political
sector competes with other sectors of the economy for talent.66
To explore these issues, consider the following example based on Mattozzi and Merlo
(2005b). A political party, who is deﬁned as a collection of politicians, has to recruit new
members. Opportunities to recruit new members arrive randomly, and when an opportunity
m a t e r i a l i z e st h ep a r t yh a st od e c i d ew h e t h e ro rn o tt op u r s u ei t . T h ep a r t yc a nr e c r u i t
as many new members as it likes (i.e., adding a new member does not preclude the possi-
bility of recruiting additional members). Hence, each recruiting decision can be analyzed
independently.
There exists a set of individuals of measure one who are potentially interested in be-
coming politicians. The alternative is to work in the (perfectly competitive) market sector.
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their political skills p ∈ [0,1],a n dt h e i rl a b o r
market productivity m ∈ [0,1]. The marginal distributions of political skills and labor mar-
ket productivity are both uniform on the support [0,1]. Political skills are either perfectly
correlated with labor market productivity, or they are orthogonal. Each individual knows his
political skills, but does not know his labor market productivity. Hence, he does not know
whether his political skills and labor market productivity are correlated. He only knows that
the probability they are correlated is equal to θ ∈ (2/3,1).67
66In general, intra-party competition for potential recruits is likely to be of secondary importance, as
ideological preferences are more likely to draw individuals toward any particular party.
67Alternatively, think of a market environment where a fraction θ of the ﬁrms value political skills while
54Consider the situation where the party has the opportunity to recruit a generic individual
with political skills p and has to decide whether or not to pursue it. The party observes the
political skills of the potential recruit, but not his labor market productivity.68 The labor
market does not observe either, but knows whether or not they are correlated. Moreover,
if the party makes an oﬀer to the potential recruit, the labor market knows that an oﬀer is
made, although it does not observe the content of the oﬀer.
If the party oﬀers the individual the possibility of becoming a politician, with probability
µ ∈ (1/2,1) the oﬀer generates a signal that reveals p to the labor market, while with the
complementary probability 1−µ the labor market only observes that the individual received
the oﬀer. However, if the individual receives an oﬀe rt oj o i nt h ep a r t y ,h em u s td e c i d e
whether or not to take it before he can consider alternative employment opportunities in the
labor market.




and the party pays the individual a wage wP(p),w h e r ewP(p) is an endogenous (equilibrium)
wage. Hence, if the party recruits him, the party’s payoﬀ is equal to z (p) − wP(p) and the
individual’s payoﬀ is equal to wP(p); if the party does not recruit him, the party’s payoﬀ is
equal to 0 and the individual’s payoﬀ is equal to its wage in the labor market. What will
the party do?
To answer this question, let P denote the event that the party makes an oﬀer to the
prospective recruit with political skills p. Then, his expected labor market wage is equal to:
w
M (p)=θ(µp +( 1− µ)EM [p|P]) + (1 − θ)
1
2
where EM [·] denotes the updated beliefs of the labor market about the individual’s political
skills, conditional on observing the party making an oﬀer to him but not observing a signal
of his skills.
the remaining 1 − θ does not and an individual does not know which ﬁrm has an opening.
68Hence, the party also does not know whether his political skills and labor market productivity are
correlated, but only knows that the probability they are correlated is equal to θ ∈ (2/3,1).
55It follows that the party will make an oﬀer if and only if
z (p) − w
M (p) ≥ 0
and
w
M (p)=θ(µp +( 1− µ)EM [p|P




where P∗ is the equilibrium recruiting strategy of the party.
To solve for an equilibrium, suppose that the party is a collection of politicians with
political skills pP ∈ [p0,p 00], and its recruiting strategy is to make an oﬀer to a prospective
party member with political skills p only if p ∈ [p0,p 00]. Hence, by concavity of the beneﬁt











































3 − 2θ(3 − 2θµ(2 − µ))
where, for θ ∈ (2/3,1) and µ ∈ (1/2,1),w eh a v et h a t0 <p 0 <p 00 < 1. This characterizes
the unique equilibrium recruiting strategy for the party and hence the party’s composition.
Several interesting observations emerge from these results. First, the party recruits
“mediocre” politicians: it neither pursues the very best, nor the worst political talent avail-
able. The intuition for this result is that the equilibrium selection rule used by the party
conveys potentially useful information to the labor market about the productivity of party
members. This aﬀects the equilibrium wages the party has to pay to its members. Politicians
with relatively higher skills induce a positive externality on party wages and make all party
members more expensive, thus forcing the party to forego the opportunity of recruiting the
very best politicians. At the same time, this externality makes individuals with relatively
low political skills, who generate relatively low beneﬁts to the party, “too expensive” thus











be the average quality of a partisan politician. Note that pP is decreasing in µ and θ.T h i s
implies that as the transparency of the political system increases (i.e., as µ goes up), the
average quality of partisan politicians decreases. Average quality also decreases if the extent
to which the labor market cares about political skills increases (i.e., θ goes up). The intuition
for these results is that an increase in either µ or θ increases competition between the party
and the labor market for scarce talent, thus making politicians with relatively high skills too
e x p e n s i v ef o rt h ep a r t y .
5G o v e r n m e n t s
The last topic of this paper concerns the executive, or government, which is ultimately
responsible for implementing policy. As it was the case for each of the other topics I ad-
dressed in the three previous sections of the paper, the government represents a fundamental
institution of democracy, and the study of government has always been at the forefront of
research in political economy. Like with the analyses of politicians and parties, however, the
major turning point that characterizes the current approach to the analysis of government
in the political economy literature was deﬁned by addressing the issue of the endogeneity of
government.
In presidential democracy, the executive (i.e., the President) is directly elected by the
citizens. Hence, the analysis of the government as an endogenous equilibrium institution is
derivative of the analyses of voters, politicians, and parties. In parliamentary democracy, on
the other hand, the executive (i.e., the cabinet) derives its mandate from and is responsible
to the legislature. This implies that who forms the government is not determined by an
election alone, but is the outcome of a negotiation among the elected members of the legis-
lature.69 Furthermore, it implies that the government may terminate at any time before the
expiration of a parliamentary term if it loses the conﬁdence of the legislature. Given these
69See, e.g., Riker (1962) for an early attempt to formalize this idea.
57considerations, most of the modern political economy literature on the endogenous formation
and dissolution of governments focuses on parliamentary democracy, and views governments
as equilibrium outcomes of a multilateral bargaining game among the parties represented in
parliament.70
Multiparty parliamentary democracy is the predominant regime in Western Europe, and
a number of interesting observations emerge from data on governments in West European
countries in the post-war period (e.g., Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003) and Laver and
Schoﬁeld (1990)).71 Since several parties typically compete and win seats in parliamentary
elections, single-party majority governments (where one party controls the majority of par-
liament and hence forms the government), are extremely rare. Coalition governments are
instead the norm, and minority (i.e., coalitions that control less than 50% of the parliamen-
tary seats), minimum-winning (i.e., coalitions that control at least 50% of the parliamentary
seats and are such that each party in the coalition is essential to retain majority status),
and surplus governments (i.e., coalitions that control more than 50% of the parliamentary
seats and are such that there is at least one party in the coalition which is not necessary
to have majority status), are all prevalent in the data. Governments frequently terminate
before the end of the legislature, and reshuﬄes (i.e., a situation where a government is re-
placed by an identical coalition, but with a diﬀerent allocation of cabinet positions), are a
common phenomenon. Moreover, minority governments are, on average, less stable than
either minimum-winning or surplus governments.
These empirical regularities provide the motivation for developing models that can ex-
plain the evidence. Non-cooperative bargaining theory typically represents the fundamental
building block of these models.72 While some of the models only focus on government forma-
70While the vast majority of contributions in this area treat parties as primitives, several models have
been proposed where voters are the only primitive while representatives, parties and governments are all
equilibrium outcomes. See, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Bandyopadhyay and Oak (2004), Baron
and Diermeier (2001), and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003).
71Additional data on coalition governments are contained in Muller and Strom (2000) and Woldendorp,
Keman and Budge (2000).
72Some models, however, build on cooperative game theory (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (1990) and
Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1996)).
58tion (e.g., Baron (1991, 1993), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Bandyopadhyay and Oak (2005)
and Morelli (1999)), others study environments where the composition and the duration of
coalition governments are both determined in equilibrium (e.g., Baron (1998), Diermeier,
Eraslan and Merlo (2002, 2003), Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), Diermeier and Merlo
(2000), Lupia and Strom (1995) and Merlo (1997)).
To illustrate the extent to which this class of models can account for some of the stylized
facts, consider the following example of a two-period model of government formation and
termination in a parliamentary democracy based on Diermeier and Merlo (2000). A parlia-
ment has to form a government to implement a policy y =( y1,y 2) in the two-dimensional
policy space R2. There are three parties, N = {a,b,c}, and two periods, t =1 ,2.E a c hp a r t y















and yi =( yi
1,y i
2) ∈ R2 denotes party i’s most preferred policy, or ideal point, where ya =
(0,0), yb =( 1 ,0),a n dyc =( 1 /2,
√
3/2). Aggregate transfers are normalized to 0 in each
period (i.e., za + zb + zc =0 ), and parties discount future payoﬀs with a common discount
factor δ ∈ [0,1].E a c hp a r t yi ∈ {a,b,c} controls a fraction πi of parliamentary seats, where
πa =5 /11, πb = πc =3 /11.
In period t =1there is a default policy q ∈ {ya,y b,y c}, which is implemented if no
government forms in that period. If q = yi, i is the party favored by the the default
policy. At the beginning of period t =1party a is the formateur (i.e., the party in charge
of conducting negotiations to form the government).73 The formateur chooses the proto-
coalition D ∈ ∆a = {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}},w h e r eD represents the set of parties that
agree to talk to each other about forming a government together.
After the proto-coalition is chosen, D selects a set of non-negative transfers to parties
73For an empirical investigation of formateur selection in government formation see Diermeier and Merlo
(2004).
59outside the proto-coalition, T(D,q)=( Tj(D,q))j∈N\D ∈ R
|N\D|
+ ,w h i c ha r ep a y m e n t st o
non-coalition parties that may be necessary to sustain the proposed government coalition.74
Given D and T, the parliament votes to approve the formateur’s proposal under majority
rule. If the proposal is defeated, the default policy is implemented and each party i ∈ N
receives a period-1 payoﬀ of Ui(q,0).
If the formateur’s proposal is accepted, the members of D bargain over a policy y(D,q) ∈
R2 and beneﬁts to coalition members B(D,q)=( Bj(D,q))j∈D ∈ R|D|.75 The bargaining pro-
cedure takes no real time and is such that for as long as no agreement is reached, each party
in D is independently selected to make a proposal with probability 1/|D|. An agreement
entails unanimous approval of the proto-coalition members. If the members of D do not
reach an agreement on a common policy and vector of transfers, then the government for-
mation attempt fails and each party i ∈ N receives a period-1 payoﬀ of Ui(q,0).I fi n s t e a d
an agreement is reached, then D forms the government and each party i ∈ D receives a
period-1 payoﬀ of Ui(y(D,q),B i(D,q)), while each party j/ ∈ D receives a period-1 payoﬀ of
Uj(y(D,q),T j(D,q)).
At the beginning of period t =2a new default policy q0 ∈ {ya,yb,y c} is realized with
probabilities (1/3,1/3,1/3). If a government formed in period t =1 , then after observing
q0 the incumbent government can renegotiate its agreement. Renegotiation is similar to
g o v e r n m e n tf o r m a t i o n ,e x c e p tf o rt h ef a c tt h a tt h ec o a l i t i o ni sﬁx e da n dg i v e nb yt h ei n -
cumbent government. Hence, ﬁrst the government may choose a set of period-2 transfers to
the parties outside the government coalition, T0(D,q0)=( T0
j(D,q0))j∈N\D ∈ R
|N\D|
+ .G i v e n
T0(D,q0), a vote is then taken to determine whether the incumbent government retains the
conﬁdence of a parliamentary majority to continue its mandate. If the government retains
the conﬁdence of the parliament, it then bargains over a policy y0(D,q0) and beneﬁts to its
members B(D,q0)=( B0
j(D,q0))j∈D ∈ R|D| for period t =2 . If an agreement is reached,
then D c o n t i n u e sa sag o v e r n m e n ta n dp e r i o d - 2 payoﬀs to the parties are determined as a
74These can be thought of as government posts other than cabinet ministries that can be allocated to
opposition parties.
75These can be thought of as ministerial positions, that can only be allocated to parties within the gov-
ernment coalition.
60function of y0(D,q0), B0(D,q0) and T0(D,q0).I f D fails to reach an agreement or loses the
conﬁdence of the parliament, then D terminates.
If the incumbent government terminates or no government formed in period t =1 ,t h e n
a new government formation process begins in period t =2with the selection of a formateur
k ∈ {a,b,c}, where the probability each party i is chosen to be the formateur is equal to
πi. Like in period t =1 , the outcome of the government formation process determines the
period-2 payoﬀs to the parties. In particular, if a government D0 ∈ ∆k forms, then each
party i ∈ D0 receives a period-2 payoﬀ of Ui(y0(D0,q0),B0
i(D0,q 0)) while each party j/ ∈ D0
receives a period-2 payoﬀ of Uj(y0(D0,q0),T0
j(D0,q 0)). If instead no government forms, then
each party i ∈ N receives a period-2 payoﬀ of Ui(q0,0).
Following Diermeier and Merlo (2000), we characterize the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium of the game using backwards induction. Suppose ﬁrst that a new government forma-
tion process begins in period t =2and D0 is chosen as the proto-coalition. Then D0 forms

































0)=0 , j ∈ N\D
0.
To see that this is the case, note ﬁr s tt h a ti fD0 contains either 2 or 3 p a r t i e s( i . e . ,i ti s
a majority), it does not need any support from outside the coalition to be approved by
parliament. Hence, T0
j(D0,q0)=0 .I f i n s t e a d D0 contains only one party (i.e., it is a
minority), it may need the support of another party to be approved by parliament. But
in this case the formateur party would want to implement its most preferred policy, and
since the locations of the three parties’ ideal points are symmetric, and the payoﬀ function
ui (y) has circular indiﬀerence curves, there will always be at least a party other than the
formateur who is indiﬀerent between the default policy q0 and the policy most preferred by
61the formateur. Hence, there will always be (at least) an additional party willing to support
a minority government for free. If follows that T0
j(D0,q 0)=0for all D0 and q0.
N e x t ,n o t et h a te ﬃcient bargaining within the proto-coalition implies that the policy
chosen is the one that maximizes the sum of the payoﬀs of the parties in the coalition. Given
the quadratic speciﬁcation of ui (y) this policy is given by the average of the ideal points
of the parties in the coalition, independent of the default policy q0. Since in the event of
disagreement the policy outcome is q0, the default policy aﬀects however the allocation of
beneﬁts. In particular, the “cake” C (D0,q0) that is available for distribution to the proto-
coalition is equal to the sum of the diﬀerences in the payoﬀs of the parties within the coalition




















This represents the total increment in the payoﬀs of the coalition partners from implementing
the optimal policy y0(D0,q 0) rather than q0. Given the structure of the bargaining game, the
parties within the proto-coalition unanimously agree to a split of the cake where each party
























i(D0,q 0) is given in the expression above.
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(0,0) if D0 = {a}
(1,0) if D0 = {b}
(1/2,
√
3/2) if D0 = {c}


















if D0 = {a,b,c}
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0 if D0 = {i}
1 if D0 = {j}
1 if D0 = {l}
1/2 if D0 = {i,j}
1/2 if D0 = {i,l}
3/2 if D0 = {j,l}
1 if D0 = {a,b,c}
The formateur party k then chooses the proto-coalition that maximizes its payoﬀ.S i n c ee a c h
party i ∈ D0 receives a payoﬀ equal to ui(q0)+C(D0,q0)/|D0| and ui(yi)=0and ui(yj)=−1,
for all i,j ∈ {a,b,c}, i 6= j, it follows that if q0 = yk,t h e nk chooses D0 = {a,b,c}, while if
q0 6= yk,t h e nk chooses D0 = {k}.T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h ep a y o ﬀ to the formateur party k is
equal to 1/3 if q0 = yk and 0 if q0 6= yk while the payoﬀ t oap a r t yi that is not the formateur
is equal to −1 if q0 6= yk and −2/3 if q0 = yk.
Let Vi (q0) denote party i’s expected continuation payoﬀ if a new government needs to be







3πi − 1 if q0 = yi
πi + 1
3πj − 1 if q0 = yj
,
which implies that if q0 = ya, Va (ya)=−13/33 and Vb (ya)=Vc (ya)=−19/33, while if
q0 6= ya, Va (q0)=−5/11 and Vb (q0)=Vc (q0)=−7/11.
Consider now the renegotiation problem faced by an incumbent government D after the
realization of q0. Recall that since party a is the formateur in period t =1 ,i tm u s tb et h e
case that D ∈ ∆a = {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}. Since renegotiation is similar to proto—
coalition bargaining, except that failure to reach agreement leads to an expected payoﬀ of
Vi (q0) instead of ui(q0), it follows that if the incumbent government D is a majority (i.e.,
D 6= {a}), then D remains in power in period t =2and implements policy y0(D,q0) equal
to the average of the ideal points of the parties in the government coalition. The expression
for the beneﬁts to the coalition partners is also similar to the one derived above, but where
Vi (q0) replaces ui(q0), and transfers to parties outside the government coalition are equal to
zero.
63If, on the other hand D = {a} (i.e., it is a minority government), then if q0 = ya the
government terminates; while if q0 6= ya the minority government remains in power with the
external support of one of the other parties, implements policy ya,a n dm a k e sat r a n s f e r
equal to 4/11 with equal probability either to party b or to party c (and no transfer to the
other party). The result follows immediately from the fact that if q0 = ya,t h ep a y o ﬀ gain
to party a from staying in power is equal to 13/33 and either one of the other parties would
need a transfer of 14/33 to support the government; while if q0 6= ya the payoﬀ gain to party
a from staying in power is equal to 5/11 and either one of the other parties would only need
at r a n s f e ro f4/11 to support the government.
Let V 0
i (D) be party i’s expected continuation payoﬀ at the beginning of period t =2 ,
prior to the realization of q0,i fg o v e r n m e n tD is in power. Since each realization of q0 is
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99 if D = {a}
− 7
44 if D = {a,b}
− 7
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−73
99 if D = {a}
−15
44 if D = {a,i}
−3
4 if D = {a,j}
−13
33 if D = {a,b,c}
.
The last step of the equilibrium characterization involves solving for D.S i n c e p r o t o -
coalition bargaining in period t =1is similar to the bargaining problems analyzed before,
simply note that if D is chosen as the proto-coalition it forms the government. If D is a
majority (i.e., D 6= {a}), then again it implements policy y(D,q) equal to the average of
the ideal points of the parties in the proto-coalition. The expression for the beneﬁts to the
coalition partners is also the same as the one derived above, except that ui(q) replaces ui(q0),
and transfers to parties outside the government coalition are equal to zero.
If, on the other hand D = {a} (i.e., it is a minority), then it implements policy ya,a n d
makes a transfer equal to δ(4/33) t ot h ep a r t yt h a ti sn o tf a v o r e db yt h ed e f a u l tp o l i c yq
64(or, if neither party is favored, to either party with equal probability), in order to obtain its
external support. This result follows from the fact that if both parties were to vote against
D = {a},t h e nq would be implemented in period t =1 , and a new government negotiation
would follow in period t =2yielding the party that is not favored by the default policy q an
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1
4 − δ 7
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1
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1
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−δ49
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−3
4 − δ 7
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−1
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−2
3 − δ 7
33 if D = {a,b,c}
.
Given the default policy q,t h ef o r m a t e u rp a r t ya chooses the government that maximizes
its payoﬀ. Hence, if q = ya,t h eg o v e r n m e n tt h a tf o r m si np e r i o dt =1is the surplus
coalition {a,b,c}, which remains in power for two periods. If, on the other hand q 6= ya,
then if δ<3/4, the minority government {a} forms in period t =1and terminates in period
t =2with probability 1/3;w h i l ei fδ>3/4 t h eg o v e r n m e n tt h a tf o r m si np e r i o dt =1is
the minimum-winning coalition between party a and the other party that is not favored by
the default policy. If it forms, the minimum-winning government lasts until the end of the
second period. Regardless of whether the surplus or the minimum-winning government forms
65in period t =1 ,i np e r i o dt =2majority coalitions reshuﬄe the allocation of distributive
beneﬁts to their members with probability 1/3 (i.e., when q0 6= q), but do not change their
policy.
Several interesting observations emerge from the analysis. The general framework illus-
trated here through a simple example provides an equilibrium interpretation for all of the
prominent empirical regularities listed above. In particular, it explains the occurrence of
minority and surplus governments. This is in sharp contrast with standard models of bar-
gaining where only minimum-winning coalitions can form in equilibrium (e.g., Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) and Eraslan (2002)).
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the stability and the relative occurrence of dif-
ferent types of governments are closely related. When choosing a government coalition,
a formateur faces a fundamental trade-oﬀ between “control” and “durability”. On the one
hand, relatively larger coalitions may be associated with longer expected durations and hence
relatively larger cakes. On the other hand, because of proto-coalition bargaining, by includ-
ing additional parties in its coalition the formateur party would receive a smaller share of
the cake, and share the power to choose policy. The equilibrium coalition choice, and hence
the stability of government, depend on the terms of this trade-oﬀ, which in general will de-
pend on characteristics of the environment where government negotiations take place. These
considerations raise a challenge for empirical research aimed at assessing the eﬀects of consti-
tutional features of representative democracy on government stability.76 Since the choice of
the government coalition is endogenous, changes in the institutional environment are likely to
induce an “equilibrium replacement eﬀect,” where governments that are optimally chosen in
equilibrium in a particular environment, may be replaced by diﬀerent coalitions in response
to changes in the underlying environment.
These issues are addressed by Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2002, 2003), who propose
a structural approach to the empirical study of the eﬀects of constitutions on coalition gov-
ernments based on the estimation of bargaining models.77 Parliamentary democracies diﬀer
76For a recent overview of the large empirical literature on government termination see, e.g., Warwick
(1994).
77See also Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2004) for a non-technical overview.
66with respect to the speciﬁc rules in their constitutions that prescribe how their governments
form and terminate. They also diﬀer systematically with respect to the observed duration of
their government formation processes, the type (i.e., minority, minimum-winning, or surplus)
and size of the government coalitions that result from these processes, and the relative dura-
bility of their governments. These observations raise the following important questions: Can
constitutional features account for these observed diﬀerences? And, if so, which institutions
are quantitatively most important for the type and the stability of coalition governments?
To address these questions, Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003, 2004) develop an equi-
librium framework to assess quantitatively the role played by speciﬁc institutions in the
formation and dissolution of coalition governments in parliamentary democracy. They spec-
ify a general stochastic bargaining model, estimate the model’s parameters using data from
nine West European countries over the period 1947—1999, assess the ability of the model to
account for key features of the data, and then use the estimated structural model to conduct
experiments of comparative constitutional design.78 Their analysis accounts for many of the
empirical regularities identiﬁed by the existing literature and interprets them in the context
of an equilibrium model which ﬁts the data well. Moreover, they assess the propensity of
diﬀerent political systems to generate government coalitions of diﬀerent types, sizes and du-
rations, and evaluate the eﬀects of changes in the length of time between elections or the
formateur selection process on the formation and duration of governments.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I have focused on some of the recent developments that have characterized
research in political economy from a microeconomic perspective over the last twenty years.
In spite of the obvious diﬀerences due to the speciﬁc nature of each topic, there is a key
element of commonality in this research which has contributed to deﬁne modern political
economy as a ﬁeld. It is the use of a common language (a consistent set of analytical tools),
and a coherent class of models that allow us to analyze political institutions and outcomes
as endogenous, equilibrium phenomena.
78For a general theory of stochastic bargaining, see Eraslan and Merlo (2002) and Merlo and Wilson (1995,
1998).
67The path traced by the work of a large number of economists and political scientists over
more than two centuries started from a situation where political institutions could not ﬁti n
the precise deﬁnition of an economy. Since voters, politicians, parties, bureaucrats, interest
groups, governments were not considered as part of the primitives that describe an economy,
these scholars made them primitives of a political economy. Much of the research in this area
over the last ﬁfty years has been devoted to taking the analysis of political institutions to
a deeper, more fundamental level. This path has lead to a more precise notion of what the
primitives of a political economy are, and how to model political institutions as endogenous
objects which depend on such primitives.
This does not mean that the ﬁeld of political economy has reached maturity or the status
of “normal science.” In fact, much eﬀort is currently being devoted to confront the diﬃcult
challenges that arise from the notion that constitutions and the rules of democracy are
themselves equilibrium phenomena. But the set of tools developed in the recent past for
the speciﬁc purpose of analyzing political institutions can only help to push the discipline
further in this exciting direction.
The fundamental notion that political institutions are endogenous, also raises an im-
portant challenge for empirical research in economics. Empirical work in several ﬁelds of
economics constantly relies on diﬀerences in institutions as providing a fundamental source
of exogenous variation to address many diﬀerent questions with important policy implica-
tions. Recognizing that political institutions are equilibrium outcomes may severely limit
the usefulness of several common approaches to empirical research. However, theoretical
developments in political economy provide a better understanding of the equilibrium rela-
tionships between primitives and institutions, and oﬀer important insights for analyzing the
data and interpreting what we observe. These developments will hopefully prove beneﬁcial
to further empirical research on these important topics.
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